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Abstract 
The purpose of this research is to investigate how to better achieve 
contracting unity of effort in the U.S. Central Command area of operations and the 
implications for other combatant commands in similar contingency situations.  In the 
U.S. Central Command area of operations, numerous contracting agencies operate 
in Afghanistan, each with its own contract authority, but these agencies have little 
synchronization and no common operating picture.  In contrast, there is only one 
overarching operational command authority in this area with a clear chain of 
command to help accomplish common objectives and achieve operational unity of 
effort.  
After completing a literature review of our topic, we conducted in-depth 
interviews with senior Department of Defense individuals who were knowledgeable 
and/or experienced with contingency contracting in the U.S. Central Command area 
of operations.  This approach allowed us to gain detailed information and examples 
from our respondents.  After a detailed analysis of selected interview data, we made 
our final recommendations on improving contracting unity of effort and increasing the 
effectiveness of operational contract support across the department. 
Keywords: Operational Contracting Support, Contracting Unity of Effort, US 
Central Command, Contingency Contracting, Joint Theater Support Contracting 
Command. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - ii - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - iii - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
Acknowledgments 
We would like to thank our spouses and children for their tremendous love, 
support, and encouragement in our writing efforts of this MBA joint research project.  
We would like to thank the Acquisition Research Program team, Karey Shaffer and 
Tera Yoder, for providing the resources and editing services to ensure the success 
of our thesis.  We would like to thank our Naval Postgraduate School thesis 
advisors, Professors E. Cory Yoder and Bryan Hudgens, for their mentorship, 
guidance, and support. 
Finally, we would like to thank the following senior Department of Defense 
acquisition leaders, whose insights helped shape our final recommendations (in 
alphabetical order):    
 Brigadier General Joseph Bass 
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement) 
 Anna Carter 
Director, Operational Contract Support Plans & Programs, Office of the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support) 
 Lynn Conners 
Acquisition Operations Specialist, Joint Contingency Acquisition 
Support Office 
 Charles Driscoll 
Operational Contract Support Planner, Operational Contract Support 
and Services, Joint Staff, J-4 
 Major General Harold Greene 
Deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology 
 Brigadier General Theodore Harrison 
Commanding General United States Army Expeditionary Contracting 
Command 
 Colonel Mike Hoskin 
Division Chief, Operational Contract Support and Services, Joint Staff, 
J-4 
 Rear Admiral Nicholas Kalathas 
Deputy Director Contingency Contracting, Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - iv - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
 Charles (Dan) Matthews 
Policy and Doctrine Analyst, Office Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Army (Procurement), Expeditionary Contracting Support Plans 
Directorate 
 Charles (Chuck) Maurer 
Doctrine Branch Chief, Acquisition, Logistics & Technology Integration 
Office 
 Major General Camille Nichols 
Commanding General, Army Contracting Command 
 William (Bill) Reich 
Acquisition Professional, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
  Victor Solero 
Joint Contracting Acquisition Support Office Planner, U.S. Central 
Command 
 Craig Spisak 
Director of the U.S. Army’s Acquisition Support Center 
  
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - v - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
About the Authors 
Major Isaac Torres entered the Army in 2000 as a Distinguished Military 
Graduate through the Reserve Officers Training Corps program at San Diego State 
University in San Diego, CA, and was commissioned in the infantry.  He is a 
graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic Course, Infantry Mortar Leaders Course, 
Infantry Captains Career Course, Army Acquisition Basic Course, and the Army 
Intermediate Contracting Course.   
Major Isaac Torres is currently pending assignment to the U.S. Army 
Acquisition Support Center located at Fort Belvoir, VA. His previous assignments 
include the following: contingency contracting team leader, 413th Contract Support 
Brigade, Fort Shafter, HI; headquarters company commander, 1st Battalion 23rd 
Infantry Regiment, Fort Lewis, WA; Charlie Company commander, 1st Battalion 23rd 
Infantry Regiment, Fort Lewis, WA; Brigade S1, 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, 
Fort Lewis, WA; assistant operations officer, 1st Battalion 23rd Infantry Regiment, 
Fort Lewis, WA; and company executive officer, platoon leader, and Battalion S4, 
1st Battalion 23rd Infantry Regiment, Fort Lewis, WA.   
Major Torres’ deployments include a 12-month combat deployment to Iraq 
(October 2003–October 2004), 15-month combat deployment to Iraq (June 2006–
September 2007), two-month operational deployment to Indonesia (May 2011–June 
2011), and three-month operational deployment to Thailand (January 2012–March 
2012).  
Major Torres’ military decorations include the Bronze Star Medal, the Army 
Meritorious Medal with oak leaf (OLC), the Army Commendation Medal with Valor, 
the Army Commendation Medal with two OLCs, the Army Achievement Medal with 
OLC, the National Defense Service Medal, the Global War on Terrorism 
Expeditionary Medal, the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, the Combat 
Infantryman’s Badge, the Expert Infantryman’s Badge, the Ranger Tab, and the 
Parachute Badge. MAJ Torres is Contracting Level II DAWIA Certified. 
Major Marvin L. Ross entered the Army in 1998 as a military graduate 
through the Reserve Officers Training Corps program at University of Houston and 
was commissioned in field artillery.  He is a graduate of the Artillery Officer Basic 
Course, Artillery Captains Career Course, Army Acquisition Basic Course, and the 
Army Intermediate Contracting Course.   
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - vi - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
Major Marvin Ross is currently pending assignment to the U.S. Army 
Operational Test Command at Fort Bliss, El Paso, TX. His previous assignments 
include senior military evaluator, Army Evaluation Center, Aberdeen Proving 
Ground, MD; assistant product manager, Program Executive Office for Intelligence 
Electronics and Warfare Systems, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; assistant division 
fire support coordinator, 1st Calvary Division, Fort Hood, TX; assistant lead Iraq 
security force staff officer, 1st Brigade, 1st Calvary Division, Fort Hood, TX; and 
battery commander, Alpha Battery, 1st Battalion 82nd Field Artillery, Fort Hood, TX.   
Major Ross’ deployments consist of a 15-month combat deployment to Iraq 
(September 2006–December 2007), 12-month combat deployment to Iraq (March 
2004–March 2005), six-month operational deployment to Kosovo (June 1999–
December 1999), and eight-month operational deployment to Saudi Arabia 
(September 1990–May 1991).  
Major Ross’ military decorations include the Bronze Star Medal, the Army 
Meritorious Medal with two oak leaf (OLC), the Army Commendation Medal with 
three (OLC), the Army Achievement Medal with two (OLC), the National Defense 
Service Medal, the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, the Global War on 
Terrorism Service Medal, and the Combat Infantryman’s Badge.  Major Ross is 










How Can We Best Achieve Contracting Unity of Effort in the 
CENTCOM Area of Responsibility? 
20 November 2013 
MAJ Isaac Torres, USA 
MAJ Marvin Ross, USA 
Thesis Advisors:  E. Cory Yoder, Senior Lecturer 
Bryan Hudgens, Lecturer 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
position of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the federal government. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - viii - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - ix - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
Table of Contents 
I.  Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 
  Background ............................................................................................... 1 A.
  Purpose .................................................................................................... 1 B.
  Research Questions ................................................................................. 2 C.
  Methodology ............................................................................................. 2 D.
1.  Introduction .................................................................................... 2 
2.  Literature Review ........................................................................... 3 
3.  Interview Design and Structure ...................................................... 4 
4.  Key Organizations and Individuals ................................................. 5 
5.  Analytical Process .......................................................................... 6 
  Scope ....................................................................................................... 6 E.
  Organization of Report .............................................................................. 7 F.
II.  Literature Review ............................................................................................. 9 
  Introduction ............................................................................................... 9 A.
  Unity of Effort ............................................................................................ 9 B.
1.  Joint Publication (JP 3-0) Joint Operations .................................... 9 
2.  Joint Publication (JP 5-0) Joint Operational Planning .................. 10 
3.  Understanding Command and Control ......................................... 10 
4.  Contracting Unity of Effort ............................................................ 11 
  Evolution of C–JTSCC ............................................................................ 11 C.
1.  Operation Iraq Freedom: Project and Contracting Office ............. 11 
2.  Operation Iraq Freedom: Contracting Support to Forces ............. 12 
3.  Operation Enduring Freedom: Contracting Support to Forces ..... 13 
4.  Other Contracting Support ........................................................... 13 
5.  Establishment of the Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan14 
6.  Establishment of C–JTSCC ......................................................... 17 
7.  C–JTSCC Today .......................................................................... 18 
  Lessons Learned .................................................................................... 19 D.
1.  Gansler Report ............................................................................. 19 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - x - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
2.  Transforming Wartime Contracting .............................................. 20 
3.  Special Inspector General Iraq Reconstruction ............................ 22 
4.  Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction: Quarterly 
Reports ........................................................................................ 23 
5.  Government Accountability Office ................................................ 24 
  Operational Contract Support ................................................................. 25 E.
1.  What Is Operational Contract Support? ....................................... 25 
2.  Evolution of Operational Contract Support ................................... 27 
3.  Congressional Legislation ............................................................ 28 
4.  DoD Policies ................................................................................ 29 
  Conclusion .............................................................................................. 31 F.
III.  Interviews ....................................................................................................... 33 
  Introduction ............................................................................................. 33 A.
  Primary Question One ............................................................................ 33 B.
  Subsidary Question Two ......................................................................... 44 C.
  Subsidary Question Three ...................................................................... 49 D.
  Subsidary Question Four ........................................................................ 55 E.
  Conclusion .............................................................................................. 60 F.
IV.  Analysis and Findings ................................................................................... 61 
  Introduction ............................................................................................. 61 A.
  Common Theme Analysis and Findings ................................................. 61 B.
  DOTMLPF–P Analysis and Findings ...................................................... 69 C.
1.  Doctrine and Policy ...................................................................... 69 
2.  Organization ................................................................................. 69 
3.  Training, Leadership, and Education ........................................... 70 
4.  Materiel ........................................................................................ 70 
  Conclusion .............................................................................................. 70 D.
V.  Recommendations ......................................................................................... 71 
  Introduction ............................................................................................. 71 A.
  Summary ................................................................................................ 71 B.
  Recommendations .................................................................................. 72 C.
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - xi - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=




dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - xii - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - xiii - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
List of Figures 
Figure 1.  The Literature Review Model ................................................................ 4 
Figure 2.  DOTMLPF–P Framework Matrix .......................................................... 6 
Figure 3.  Project and Contracting Office Reporting Structure ............................ 12 
Figure 4.  JCC–I Organizational Chart 2004 ....................................................... 15 
Figure 5.  JCC–I/A Command and Control Issues .............................................. 16 
Figure 6.  JCC–I/A Organizational Chart ............................................................ 17 
Figure 7.  C–JTSCC Organization ...................................................................... 18 
Figure 8.  Contracting Organizations in the AOR ................................................ 19 
Figure 9.  Operational Contract Support Functions ............................................ 27 
Figure 10.  Key Operational Contract Support Documents ................................... 31 
Figure 11.  DOTMLPF–P Framework Matrix ........................................................ 61 
Figure 12.  DOTMLPF–P Framework Matrix ........................................................ 62 
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - xiv - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - xv - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 
ACC  U.S. Army Contracting Command 
ALU  Army Logistics University 
AOR  Area of Responsibility 
ASA–ALT  Assistant Secretary of the Army–Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology 
AL&T  Acquisition, Logistic & Technology 
AL&T–IO  Acquisition, Logistic & Technology–Integration Office  
ATP  Army Techniques Publication 
BG  Brigadier General 
BPLAN  Base Plan 
C2  Command and Control 
CAAF  Contractors Authorized to Accompany the Force 
CAC  Common Access Card 
CASCOM  Combined Arms Support Command 
CASM  Contingency Acquisition Support Module 
CCDR  Combatant Command Commander 
CCO  Contingency Contracting Officer 
CCT  Contingency Contracting Team 
CDR  Commander 
CENTCOM  Central Command 
CHU  Containerized Housing Unit 
CJCS  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CJOA  Combined/Joint Operations Area 
CJTF  Coalition Joint Task Force 
C–JTSCC  CENTCOM–Joint Theater Support Contracting Command 
CM  Contractor Manager 
COCOM  Combatant Command 
CoE  Center of Excellence 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - xvi - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
COIN  Counterinsurgency 
CONOPS  Concept of Operations 
CONPLAN  Concept Plan 
COR  Contracting Officer Representative 
CPA  Coalition Provisional Authority 
CS  Contracting Support 
CSB  Contracting Support Brigades 
CSI  Contract Support Integration 
CST  Contract Support Team 
CUE  Contracting Unity of Effort 
CWC  Commission on Wartime Contracting 
DALF  Direct Authority for Logistics 
DAR  Defense Acquisition Regulation 
DASA–AP  Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy–Acquistion & Procurement 
DAU  Defense Acquisition University 
DCMA  Defense Contract Management Agency 
DFARS  Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
DLA  Defense Logistics Agency 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DoDD  Department of Defense Directive 
DoDI  Department of Defense Instruction 
DOTMLPF–P Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and 
Education, Personnel, Facilities–Policy 
DPAP  Defense Procurement Acquisition Policy 
EA  Executive Agent 
ECC  Expeditionary Contracting Command 
FAR  Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FCIB  Functional Capabilities Integration Board 
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FRAGO  Fragmentary Order 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - xvii - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
FY  Fiscal Year 
GAO  U.S. Government Accountability Office 
GCC  Geographical Combatant Command 
GFLS  Government-Furnished Life Support 
HCA  Head of Contracting Activity 
HQ  Headquarters 
IG  Inspector General 
IPE  Integrated Planner and Executor 
IRB  Institutional Review Board 
JACB  Joint Acquisition Contracting Board 
JARB  Joint Acquisition Review Board 
JCASO  Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office 
JCC–I  Joint Contracting Command–Iraq 
JCC–I/A  Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan 
JCCS  Joint Contingency Contracting System 
JCIDS  Joint Capabilities Integration Development System 
JCSB  Joint Contracting Support Board 
JEP  Joint Exercise Program 
JFC  Joint Forces Command 
JFLCC  Joint Force Land Component Commander 
JLPSB  Joint Logistic Procurement Support Board 
JOA  Joint Operation Area 
JOPEC  Joint OCS Planning & Execution Course 
JP  Joint Publication 
JPME  Joint Professional Military Education 
JRRB  Joint Requirement Review Board 
JTF  Joint Task Force 
JTSCC  Joint Theater Support Contracting Command 
LOA  Letter of Authorization 
LOGCAP  Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - xviii - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
LSC  Lead Service for Contracting 
LSCC  Lead Service for Contract Coordination 
LTG  Lieutenant General 
MG  Major General 
MILCON  Military Construction 
MNF–I  Multi-National Forces–Iraq 
NDAA  National Defense Authorization Act 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
NORTHCOM  Northern Command 
NPS  Naval Postgraduate School 
NSC  National Security Council 
OCS  Operational Contract Support 
OCSSD  Operational Contract Support Service Division 
OEF  Operation Enduring Freedom 
OIF  Operation Iraqi Freedom 
OMB  Office of Management and Budget 
OMI  OCS Mission Integration 
OPCON  Operational Control 
OPLAN  Operational Plan 
OPORD  Operations Order 
ORHA  Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
OSCIC  OSC Integration Cell 
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense 
OUSD  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
PCO  Project and Contracting Office 
PEO  Program Executive Officer 
PSC  Private Security Contractor 
RC  Regional Command 
SIGAR  Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
SIGIR  Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - xix - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
SOCOM  Special Operations Command 
SPOT  Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker 
SRO  Stabilization and Reconstruction Operation 
TAA  Total Army Analysis 
TBC  Theater Business Clearance 
TPFDD  Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data 
USA  United States Army  
USACE  United States Army Corps of Engineers 
USAF  United States Air Force 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
USCENTCOM  United States Central Command 
USFOR–A  United States Forces–Afghanistan 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - xx - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=




Contracting operations are changing at a rapid pace. For the past 13 years, 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the enormous changes and 
challenges in conducting operational contract support (OCS).  According to the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting (Schwartz & Church, 2013), an estimated $31 
billion to $60 billion “was lost to fraud, waste, and abuse in contingency operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan” (p. 8).  Additionally, according to 2012 figures from the 
Department of Defense (DoD), “contractors in Afghanistan exceeded 109,000 
compared to the approximately 84,200 military personnel present at that time” 
(Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2013, p. 1).  It is generally agreed that 
many OCS problems were due to insufficient OCS planning, poor strategic OCS 
management, and minimal oversight of contractors (Schwartz & Church, 2013).  The 
DoD’s increased need for contract support and inadequate preparations to execute 
OCS led to an overall lack of contracting unity of effort (CUE) across Central 
Commands’ (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). 
In response to the overwhelming need for CUE in the early days of the Iraq 
war, the concept of OCS emerged and the DoD established a new contracting 
command structure.  In 2004, the Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan 
(JCC–I/A) was created in an effort to unify contracting activities within Iraq and 
Afghanistan (Joint Contracting, 2006).  In 2010, JCC–I/A was re-designated as the 
Central Command Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C–JTSCC).  
Although the military has used contracted support for centuries, Joint Publication 4-
10 (JP 4-10; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2008), Operational 
Contract Support, was the first publication to address joint doctrine. JP 4-10 (CJCS, 
2008) defined successful OCS as the “ability to orchestrate and synchronize the 
provision of integrated contracted support and management of contractor personnel 
providing that support to the joint force in a designated operational area” (p. I-2). As 
operations decline in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is critical that we learn from past 
operations to avoid repeating the same challenges in future military engagements.   
 PURPOSE B.
The purpose of this research is to investigate how to successfully achieve 
CUE in the CENTCOM AOR and the implications for other combatant commands in 
similar contingency situations.  Unity of effort is closely related to unity of command 
and is necessary to achieve effective and efficient processes during military 
operations.  As a subset of unity of effort, CUE addresses the unique challenges of 
contingency contracting where multiple agencies have contracting authority in a 
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given AOR.  Contracting authority is not the same as command authority.  
Contracting authority gives the contracting officer the authority to obligate the United 
States government, whereas command authority gives a combatant commander the 
authority to employ forces (CJCS, 2008).  
In the CENTCOM AOR, numerous contracting agencies operate in 
Afghanistan, each with its own contract authority, but these agencies have very little 
coordination and no procurement common operating picture.  In contrast, there is 
only one overarching operational command authority in the CENTCOM AOR with a 
clear chain of command to help accomplish common objectives and achieve 
operational unity of effort.   
 RESEARCH QUESTIONS C.
The primary and subsidiary research questions are designed to address the 
numerous disparate contracting activities operating in the CENTCOM AOR and to 
discover possible solutions that achieve greater contracting efficiency and 
effectiveness. Subsidiary research questions are closely related to the primary 
research question and attempt to explore the interviewees’ responses to obtain 
clarifying examples and to define important themes.  Our questions are as follows:   
Primary Research Question 
1. How can we achieve better contracting unity of effort in the CENTCOM 
AOR? 
Subsidiary Research Questions 
2. What steps has C–JTSCC taken to synchronize current contracting 
activities and to what extent are these efforts effective?  
3. Are there any discussions, initiatives, or measures currently in 
development to help achieve better contracting unity of effort for future 
similar operations?   
4. In order to prevent the same lessons learned, are there any OCS 
doctrinal changes that need to be made to ensure we have better 
contracting unity of effort?  
 METHODOLOGY D.
1. Introduction 
In this section, we describe the methods and investigative techniques used to 
answer our research questions.  Specifically, we describe the process we used to 
conduct an extensive literature review, how we developed our questions, our method 
for choosing interviewees, the technique for conducting interviews, and how we 
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categorized the data collected.  We also discuss the framework used to analyze our 
findings and present our recommendations. 
2. Literature Review 
We conducted a literature review to obtain a complete understanding and 
identify the leading documents within our research area.  In The Literature Review 
(Machi & McEvoy, 2009), the authors explained that a literature review presents a 
logically argued case founded on an extensive understanding of the current state of 
knowledge about a field of study.  We conducted numerous database searches and 
discovered a wealth of information concerning the last decade of contingency 
contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Specific examples include, but are not limited 
to, GAO resources, Naval Postgraduate School and War College thesis documents, 
resources published through the DoD, Special Inspector General resources, 
publications by the Congressional Research Service, and resources published 
through the U.S. Army.  We also received numerous newly emerging documents 
concerning our topic from our interviews.    
In order to guide our process, we found it useful to utilize the six-step 
Literature Review Model (Machi & McEvoy, 2009; see Figure 1).  This model helped 
us manage the review process and focus on the most recent and significant 
literature.   
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Figure 1. The Literature Review Model  
(Machi & McEvoy, 2009, p. 5)   
3. Interview Design and Structure 
We determined that we needed to conduct qualitative interviews with 
individuals who were knowledgeable and/or experienced with contingency 
contracting in the CENTCOM AOR.  Our primary tool for gathering these data was 
an in-depth interview style called responsive interviewing.  This interviewing style 
emphasizes searching for context and richness while remaining flexible in design 
(Rubin & Rubin, 2012).  
In compliance with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) guidelines, we 
ensured that all interviews were conducted in accordance with the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) IRB protocol.  We conducted our interviews on a 
volunteer basis and allowed interviewees to address their concerns or reservations 
at any time during our research.  At all times, interviewees were given the option to 
terminate discussions.  We ensured the entire process remained within the IRB 
process and was done without harm to the interviewees. 
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To maintain depth and clarity from respondents, we remained flexible in 
structure and listened more than we talked. Taking a semi-structured approach, we 
always began our interviews with our main research question but tailored our 
subsequent questions based on the responses of our interviewees.  In order to keep 
the interviews on target or seek clarification, we often introduced probing responses 
or questions, all related to the primary or subsidiary questions.  Rubin and Rubin 
(2012) described probes as “questions, comments, or gestures used by the 
interviewer to help manage the conversation” (p. 118).  We used follow-up questions 
to seek further detail and clarification on significant concepts, themes, and ideas.  
Upon completion of our interviews, our recordings were professionally transcribed by 
the NPS Acquisition Research Program.  A list of our research questions can be 
found in Section C of this chapter. 
4. Key Organizations and Individuals 
We developed our list of key organizations and individuals with help from our 
advisors and professional mentors.  We interviewed all key organizations within the 
DoD and subordinate frameworks to gain a complete and thorough understanding of 
our topic.  We quickly discovered that our topic touched a wide variety of DoD 
organizations due to the complex nature of OCS.  As OCS cuts across multiple 
organizations and functional areas, we focused our interviews on the following 
organizations: 
 C-JTSCC 
 Joint Staff (J4) Operational Contract Support & Services Division 
(OCSSD) 
 Joint Contracting Acquisition Support Organization (JCASO) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy–Acquisition & Procurement 
(DASN–AP) 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, 
and Technology; ASA[ALT]) 
 Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology–Integration Office (ALT–IO) 
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
& Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]) 
 Army Contracting Command (ACC) 
 Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) 
To help us establish initial communication with key individuals, we relied 
heavily on our professional mentors and advisors.  With their assistance, we were 
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able to interview past C–JTSCC commanders and several other general officers and 
senior DoD leaders regarding the numerous changes in conducting OCS. A 
complete list of our interviewees can be found in Chapter III. 
5. Analytical Process 
In order to analyze the data gathered from the literature and interviews, we 
utilized the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, 
Personnel, Facilities–Policy (DOTMLPF–P) framework.  Easily understood 
throughout the DoD, the DOTMLPF–P framework allowed us to categorize our major 
finding and place them in the correct DOTMLPF–P grouping (see Figure 2).  Finally, 
upon completion of this analysis, we were able to develop our final 
recommendations and recommendations for further research.  
 
Figure 2. DOTMLPF–P Framework Matrix  
 SCOPE E.
Although we limited our research focus to CUE within the CENTCOM AOR, 
we quickly discovered the broader connection to OCS.  Specifically, we discovered 
through our literature review and interviewees that improving CUE cannot be done 
without improving the overarching concept of OCS.  Within the CENTCOM AOR, we 
focused on the contingency operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  Although we detail the evolution of C–JTSCC 
from its beginnings as the Project Contract Office in 2003, we honed in on the 
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significant OCS documents that effected CUE after the release of the Gansler 
Commission Report in 2007 (Gansler et al., 2007). This was the first landmark report 
to identify and highlight the vast problems of contract support in the CENTCOM 
AOR.  Finally, we relied heavily on the data we collected during our interviews to 
capture the strategic direction for OCS across the DoD. 
 ORGANIZATION OF REPORT F.
This report is organized into five chapters. In Chapter I, we provide the 
overarching structure and direction of our research. In Chapter II, we review the 
concept of unity of effort, the evolution of C–JTSCC, significant lessons learned, and 
the history of OCS. In Chapter III, we present selected raw data found during our in-
depth interviews. In Chapter IV, we identify common themes and categorize them 
using the DOTMLPF–P analysis framework. Finally, in Chapter V, we present our 
recommendations and areas for further research.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 INTRODUCTION A.
In this chapter, we provide background on C–JTSCC and explore published 
research, government reports, and various other documents to gain a clear picture 
regarding how the C–JTSCC evolved into the organization it is today.  First, we 
cover the concept of unity of effort and its importance to contracting in the 
CENTCOM AOR.  Second, we present the history and evolution of C–JTSCC from 
its beginnings in Iraq and Afghanistan to its precursor organization, the Joint 
Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC–I/A).  Third, we examine the key 
literature that addresses lessons learned with a focus on the primary research 
question. Finally, we cover the history of OCS while highlighting existing DoD 
doctrine, policies, and initiatives to help us understand why and how C–JTSCC 
operates in its current state.   
 UNITY OF EFFORT B.
Unity of effort is a universal principle of war that is essential when conducting 
military operations.  Unity of effort is closely related to unity of command and is 
necessary to achieve effective and efficient processes during military operations.  
Planning for and executing this concept helps determine the success or failure of a 
commander’s mission.  According to Alberts and Hayes (2006), commanders see 
unity of effort as being associated with unity of command.  This section investigates 
how unity of effort impacts the efficiency and effectiveness of organizations.  In 
addition, this section examines the concept of unity of effort as presented in doctrinal 
sources and government reports.   
1. Joint Publication (JP 3-0) Joint Operations 
Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0), Joint Operations (CJCS, 2011b), outlines 
operational guidance for the joint force commander (JFC) and subordinates in 
planning, preparing, executing, and assessing joint military operations.  JP 3-0 
defines unity of effort as “the coordination and cooperation toward common 
objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or 
organization (CJCS, 2011b, p. A2).  This definition is significant because it 
addresses the need for the various organizations to move toward common 
objectives.  With so many contracting agencies operating in the CENTCOM AOR, 
it’s important to achieve CUE to reduce operational inefficiency and redundancy.   
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2. Joint Publication (JP 5-0) Joint Operational Planning 
Joint Publication (JP 5-0), Joint Planning (CJCS, 2011c), summarizes 
planning guidance for the joint task force commander and subordinates during joint 
military operations.  JP 5-0 is vital to commanders and their staff in providing the 
doctrinal foundation for planning and executing joint operations.  In terms of 
interorganizational planning, JP 5-0 provides the following unity of effort example:   
Interorganizational planning and coordination is the interaction that 
occurs among elements of DOD; engaged [United States Government] 
USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal 
agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; IGOs; 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the private sector for the 
purpose of accomplishing an objective. Successful interorganizational 
coordination of plans facilitates unity of effort among multiple 
organizations by promoting common understanding of the capabilities, 
limitations, and consequences of military and civilian actions. (CJCS, 
2011c, p.  xviii)   
Although JP 5-0 does not specifically say anything concerning contracting 
organizations, the example provided can apply to various contracting agencies 
operating in the CENTCOM AOR.  JP 5-0 is the key joint planning document that 
highlights the importance of unity of effort throughout the joint military operation 
planning process.     
3. Understanding Command and Control   
In Understanding Command and Control, Alberts and Hayes (2006) described 
unity of effort as a complex task that is seldom achieved.  The authors elaborated on 
this concept by stating,   
This point has also been made by those who seek to replace the 
classic principle of war “unity of command” with the principle “unity of 
effort.”  Even unity of effort is, from what we have seen in Bosnia, 
Rwanda, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and humanitarian assistance 
efforts around the world, an ideal that is seldom achieved in practice. 
We have concluded that what is achievable in coalitions, humanitarian, 
reconstruction, and peace operations is unity of purpose. (Alberts & 
Hayes, 2006, p. 88) 
Despite the initial low success rate of CUE in the early stages of CENTCOM 
contracting, commanders and their staff remain vigilant in achieving this concept as 
it provides effectiveness and efficiency in their operations.  They have continuously 
improved their organizational abilities and have incorporated the numerous lessons 
learned to seek better CUE. 
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4. Contracting Unity of Effort 
As a subset of unity of effort, CUE addresses the unique challenges of 
contingency contracting where multiple agencies have contracting authority in a 
given AOR.  These challenges were identified in Joint Publication 4-10 (JP-4-10), 
Operational Contract Support (CJCS, 2008), as follows: 
Multiple contracting authorities support (either directly or indirectly) any 
given contingency. In most situations, the JFC will have limited direct 
control over external support contracts and very little influence over 
decisions related to the use of systems support contracts. (p.ix) 
In the CENTCOM AOR numerous disparate contracting agencies operate in 
Afghanistan, each it’s their own contract authority, but these agencies have very little 
synchronization and no common operating picture.  For example, as of January 
2013, there were 29 different contracting organizations executing contracting 
operations in Afghanistan (M. D. Hoskin, personal communication, January 17, 
2013).  In contrast, there is only one overarching operational command authority in 
the CENTCOM AOR with a clear chain of command to achieve common objectives 
and operational unity of effort.  
 EVOLUTION OF C–JTSCC C.
From the beginning of OIF, contracting organizations and leadership have 
continuously adapted to better support the warfighter while simultaneously working 
toward minimizing inefficient practices and creating better unity of effort.  According 
to Cunnane (2005), “As an austere theater matures, contracting operations naturally 
evolve from a pure contingency focus to a sustainment-based strategy” (p. 47). The 
following paragraphs capture the significant historical highlights of C–JTSCC and 
provide background information for understanding our research questions. 
1. Operation Iraq Freedom: Project and Contracting Office 
Before the official start of OIF in March 2003, the Project and Contracting 
Office (PCO) was established in December 2003 to work with the Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and then the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA; Williams & Roddin, 2006).  This office was created to 
assist with reconstruction efforts and had very little coordination with the military 
contracting teams assigned to maneuver units.  As the Department of State (DoS) 
transitioned from the ORHA to the CPA in April 2003, it became clear to CPA 
leadership that there was a need for additional contracting staff members (Special 
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction [SIGIR], 2009).   
Although the U.S. Army was responsible for staffing, resourcing and running 
the PCO, it had a dual reporting relationship with the DoS and DoD (see Figure 3).  
Under this structure, the PCO was responsive to the U.S ambassador to Iraq 
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“concerning the requirements and priorities for projects … and to the Multi-National 
Force-Iraq (MNF-I) commanding general with respect to requirements and priorities 
concerning training and equipping the Iraqi military forces” (SIGIR, 2009, p. 157).  
Although this construct attempted to clarify roles, it actually exacerbated the 
ambiguous management situation, making it more difficult to achieve CUE. 
 
Figure 3. Project and Contracting Office Reporting Structure  
(Hess & Taylor, 2004)  
2. Operation Iraq Freedom: Contracting Support to Forces 
Contracting unity of effort was non-existent in the early phases of OIF 
(Houglan, 2006).  As the invasion of Iraq began, numerous contracting activities 
operated in the AOR, but few military contracting teams supported the vast influx of 
forces.  In May 2003, there were just four joint contracting teams (four-person 
teams) stationed in Kuwait and four contingency contracting teams embedded with 
Third Army tactical units (Cunnane, 2005).  By July of that year, there were a total of 
24 military contracting personnel from the Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF) 
supporting 120,000 U.S. forces (Cunnane, 2005).   
The primary mission for these teams was contingency contracting. As forces 
quickly advanced throughout Iraq, these contracting teams provided critical 
warfighter needs in the fastest, most efficient way possible.  Operating throughout 
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Iraq with no CUE, some of these personnel worked alongside their respective units 
while others were positioned in major military hubs (Cunnane, 2005).  Cunnane 
(2005) further indicated that through “June 2003 there was no contracting leadership 
or presence at the CJTF HQ level providing command, control and oversight of 
contracting personnel and operations” (p. 49). 
3. Operation Enduring Freedom: Contracting Support to Forces 
There is little published literature and few documents regarding the early 
contracting days of OEF.  This section relies primarily on after action reports 
conducted by contingency contracting officers and research conducted by D’Angelo, 
Houglan, and Ruckwardt (2008). 
Contracting support in Afghanistan displayed many of the same problems as 
in Iraq, including “a lack of a contracting organizational structure, inefficient resource 
allocation, and minimal training to the incoming contingency contracting officers” 
(D’Angelo et al., 2008).  By June 2003, just 23 military contracting personnel 
supported over 40,000 troops across five installations in Afghanistan (D’Angelo et 
al., 2008).  Although these numbers are slightly better than those for the initial 
invasion into Iraq, they highlight the lack of operational contract support planning. 
Captain B. A. Rockow (2003), a contingency contracting officer in Kandahar, 
highlighted the challenges associated with managing the initial phases of contracting 
in OEF.  As one of the first contracting officers to support OEF, Rockow arrived in 
Kandahar to find no resources available to offer advice or synchronize contracting 
throughout the area (Rockow, 2003). He was, therefore, forced to learn how to 
develop a system of management and support for OCS.  According to D’Angelo et 
al. (2008), 
although a theater-wide system of synchronizing efforts between the 
contracting offices did not exist, he [Rockow] tapped into the resources 
of contingency contracting officers already located in Karachi, 
Pakistan, and Seeb, Oman, to obtain the essential supplies not 
available in Afghanistan. (p. 74) 
CPT Rockow’s report identifies the lack of contracting synchronization during 
these early days and his reliance on communication and collaboration to bring about 
greater CUE.   
4. Other Contracting Support 
By the summer of 2003, there were numerous other agencies providing 
contracting support to OIF and OEF.  In addition to the PCO and CJTF military 
contracting officers, these other agencies operated independently with little to no 
coordination or communication between organizations.  These contracting activities 
included the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), providing 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 14 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
infrastructure and basic services; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), 
focusing on construction and civil engineering projects; the Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA), coordinating the Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program (LOGCAP); and Special Operations contracting teams, conducting focused 
procurements in support of their mission (Cunnane, 2005).  With no centralized 
contracting command or leadership to coordinate contracting activities across the 
AOR, DoD leadership began discussing the idea of a joint contracting command. 
5. Establishment of the Joint Contracting Command–
Iraq/Afghanistan 
As operations and military systems matured in Iraq, contracting support also 
matured to support this new transition. In “The Evolution of Contracting in Iraq,” 
Cunanne (2005) outlined the reasons driving the transition to a more mature 
contracting environment: 
 growing demand for complex contracting actions; 
 growing need for theater-wide acquisition visibility and consolidated 
procurements; 
 constant struggle to recruit a capable contracting workforce; 
 need for a contracting organizational structure that could support the 
(then) developing MNF–I four-star headquarters; and 
 ability to track nonperforming contractors (bad actors) across theater, 
and emerging army leadership’s guidance to move away from 
LOGCAP to direct contracting (p. 51). 
Early in 2004, CENTCOM and MNF–I considered the idea of a Joint 
Contracting Command–Iraq (JCC–I) in order to bring about greater CUE.  JCC–I 
would bring coordinated contracting support to theater-wide operations under the 
direction of a single commander.  B. G. Seay, already the PCO Head of the 
Contracting Activity, would become the JCC–I’s first commander on November 12, 
2004 (Houglan, 2006).  JCC–I subsequently became a major subordinate command 
of MNF–I (see Figure 4; SIGIR, 2006). 
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Figure 4. JCC–I Organizational Chart 2004  
(Cunnane, 2005) 
In July 2005, CENTCOM issued FRAGO (a fragmentary order is an 
abbreviated order that eliminates redundant information) 09-790, Contracting and 
Organizational Changes, in order to bring the Afghanistan contracting support under 
the control of JCC–I (D’Angelo et al., 2008).  With this order, JCC–I became JCC–
I/A.  Although the installation of JCC–I/A was seen as a significant upgrade over 
previous methods of controlling contracting activities in a contingency environment, 
the organization continued to experience difficulties in managing the various 
contracting activities operating in the AOR (see Figure 5).  Developed out of 
necessity to address the quickly growing contracting efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
JCC–IA provided the structure required to increase CUE.   
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Figure 5. JCC–I/A Command and Control Issues  
(Harrison, 2006) 
JCC–I/A continued to evolve by developing efficiencies and improved 
management systems to support coalition forces (see Figure 6).  In another attempt 
to achieve better CUE in Iraq and Afghanistan, CENTCOM issued FRAGO 09-1117, 
which directed all commanders in OIF and OEF to update their contracting 
organizations and relationships within CENTCOM’s AOR (D’Angelo et al., 2008).  
The FRAGO’s three primary objectives were to  
integrate warfighter campaign plans and strategy and achieve effects, 
achieve unity of effort and economies of scale that exemplify best 
business practices, and create synergy with economic activities in local 
private and public sectors, serving as a catalyst for economic growth. 
(D’Angelo et al., 2008) 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 17 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
 
Figure 6. JCC–I/A Organizational Chart  
(D’Angelo et al., 2008) 
Through continuous improvements to its managerial system, the 
establishment of JCC–I/A proved vital for contingency operations.  The organization 
has not only directed the DoD in new approaches for conducting business, but also 
revolutionized the way in which the DoD operates on a daily basis.  Each 
improvement helped lead to the overarching success of producing CUE.   
6. Establishment of C–JTSCC 
Despite the JCC–I/A’s capabilities, the drawdown of combat operations in Iraq 
eventually led to CENTCOM’s decision to re-organize contracting support. On April 
20, 2010, CENTCOM directed the transition to the C–JTSCC (Beall & Bolls, 2010; 
see Figure 7).  This change also aligned in-theater contracting organizations with 
revised joint doctrine to increase contracting unity of effort. 
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Figure 7. C–JTSCC Organization  
(M. D. Hoskin, personal communication, January 17, 2013)  
7. C–JTSCC Today 
Given the direction to end combat operations in Afghanistan, C–JTSCC is 
preparing for a diminished workload as the withdrawal of forces begins in 2014. 
Although the changing structures of CENTCOM contracting have increased 
synchronization, there still exists a lack of CUE across the AOR.  Today, there 
remain many independent contracting agencies with contracts in Afghanistan, but 
there is no overarching command and control (see Figure 8).  These contracting 
activities include systems support, external support, theater support, and non-DoD 
agencies.  Within Afghanistan, there exists little contracting synchronization, no 
contracting common operating picture, and no ability to achieve CUE for theater-
wide contracting (M. D. Hoskin, personal communication, January 17, 2013).   
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Figure 8. Contracting Organizations in the AOR  
(M. D. Hoskin, personal communication, January 17, 2013) 
 LESSONS LEARNED D.
Over the last 13 years, numerous after-action reports, government reports, 
and lessons learned have highlighted the need and importance of OCS.  Although 
there are countless documents on the subject, this section highlights only the key 
operational and strategic observations over the past six years.   
1. Gansler Report 
The Secretary of the Army established an independent Commission on Army 
Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations to review the 
lessons learned in current operations and make sound recommendations to achieve 
increased effectiveness and efficiency (Gansler et al., 2007). Urgent Reform 
Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, or the Gansler Commission Report 
(Gansler et al., 2007), was the first landmark report to identify a contracting 
environment with inexperienced personnel, increased workloads, and institutional 
neglect across Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait.  Although the Army was the focus of 
the report, Secretary Gates said the recommendations should be applied to all 
military services (DoD, 2013).   
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The commission conducted in-depth interviews with more than 100 
experienced Army acquisition professionals and senior leaders throughout the 
CENTCOM AOR.  According to Gansler et al. (2007), 
The most notable characteristic of the testimony is a nearly unanimous 
perception of the current problems, their gravity, and the urgent need 
for reform. The people in the field understand the issues and identified 
the necessary solutions, and the Commission recommendations reflect 
these valuable lessons learned.   
The Urgent Reform Required report outlined four overarching 
recommendations to improve Army acquisitions in expeditionary operations: 
1. Increase the stature, quantity, and career development of military and 
civilian contracting personnel (especially for expeditionary operations). 
2. Restructure the organization and restore responsibility to facilitate 
contracting and contract management in expeditionary and CONUS 
operations. 
3. Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in 
expeditionary operations. 
4. Obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable 
contracting effectiveness in expeditionary operations (Gansler et al., 
2007). 
All these recommendations provided better CUE for CENTCOM contracting 
and provided the necessary hard look at the contingency contracting environment.  
They quickly gained momentum throughout the DoD and subsequently helped make 
the necessary first steps towards increasing OCS efficiency and effectiveness.   
2. Transforming Wartime Contracting 
Congress created the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in response to numerous allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse 
throughout the CENTCOM AOR.  In 2008, the CWC began extensive research to 
document observations and make key recommendations.  Its final report, 
Transforming Wartime Contracting, revealed as much as $60 billion in overseas 
contracting dollars wasted in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC, 2011).  In its report, the 
CWC made 15 recommendations to improve contingency contracting operations in 
the future:  
1. Use risk factors in deciding whether to contract in contingencies. 
2. Develop deployable cadres for acquisition management and contractor 
oversight. 
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3. Phase out use of private security contractors for certain functions. 
4. Improve interagency coordination and guidance for using security 
contractors in contingency operations. 
5. Take actions to mitigate the threat of additional waste from 
unsustainability. 
6. Elevate the positions and expand the authority of civilian officials 
responsible for contingency contracting at the DoD, DoS, and USAID. 
7. Elevate and expand the authority of military officials responsible for 
contingency contracting on the Joint Staff, the combatant commanders’ 
staffs, and in the military services. 
8. Establish a new, dual-hatted senior position at OMB and the NSC to 
provide oversight and strategic direction. 
9. Create a permanent office of inspector general for contingency 
operations. 
10. Set and meet annual increases in competition goals for contingency 
contracts. 
11. Improve contractor performance-data recording and use. 
12. Strengthen enforcement tools. 
13. Provide adequate staffing and resources, and establish procedures to 
protect the government’s interests. 
14. Congress should provide or reallocate resources for contingency-
contracting reform to cure or mitigate the numerous defects described 
by the Commission. 
15. Congress should enact legislation requiring regular assessment and 
reporting of agencies’ progress in implementing reform 
recommendations (2011, pp. 3–12). 
The biggest contributors to CUE are recommendations 2, 4, 7, and 13.  
Recommendation 2 directly affects CUE and discusses those cases where 
performance by contract is appropriate and the role of government to provide 
acquisition management and contractor oversight.  Recommendation 4 also directly 
affects CUE and highlights the need to have cooperation among the various 
disparate contracting agencies to incorporate best practices.  Indirectly affecting 
CUE, recommendation 7 indicates the need for full involvement of senior leadership 
to have changes in agency structures and practices that affect culture and 
behaviors.  As a final example, recommendation 13 directly impacts CUE by 
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highlighting the lack of sufficient staff and resources to enable adequate 
management of all aspects of contingency contracting.   
3. Special Inspector General Iraq Reconstruction 
The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) 
was created in October 2004 by a congressional amendment to Public Law 108-106 
(SIGIR, 2013).  SIGIR was mandated to provide oversight of the Iraq Relief and 
Reconstruction Fund and all obligations, expenditures, and revenues associated 
with reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Iraq.  SIGIR’s final report, Learning 
from Iraq (2013), brings together a wealth of information and analysis to identify 
important lessons learned:  
Drawing from numerous interviews with past and present Iraqi leaders, 
senior U.S. policymakers and practitioners, members of Congress, and 
others who were involved with Iraq, this report lays out in detail the 
enormous U.S. reconstruction effort, which completed thousands of 
projects and programs since 2003, but in which there were many 
lessons learned the hard way. (SIGIR, 2013)   
Learning from Iraq (SIGIR, 2013) made these important final 
recommendations: 
1. Create an integrated civilian-military office to plan, execute, and be 
accountable for contingency rebuilding activities during stabilization 
and reconstruction operations. 
2. Begin rebuilding only after establishing sufficient security, and focus 
first on small programs and projects. 
3. Ensure full host-country engagement in program and project selection, 
securing commitments to share costs (possibly through loans) and 
agreements to sustain completed projects after their transfer. 
4. Establish uniform contracting, personnel, and information management 
systems that all Stabilization and Reconstruction Operation (SRO) 
participants use. 
5. Require robust oversight of SRO activities from the operation’s 
inception. 
6. Preserve and refine programs developed in Iraq, like the Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program and the Provincial Reconstruction 
Team program, that produced successes when used judiciously. 
7. Plan in advance, plan comprehensively and in an integrated fashion, 
and have backup plans ready to go. (SIGIR, 2013, p. xii) 
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Although all these items provide valuable lessons learned for Iraq, 
recommendations, 1, 4, and 7 have a direct impact on achieving better CUE. 
Recommendations 1 and 4 address the current inadequate system of executing 
contingency rebuilding activities.  The SIGIR report (2013) suggests that an 
integrated civilian-military office “would provide clarity about who is responsible for 
planning and executing rebuilding activities, truly resolving the dual systemic 
weaknesses of the Iraq program: the lack of unity of command and poor unity of 
effort” (p. 129).  Recommendation 7 impacts CUE by addressing the need for 
planning in advance using an integrated approach.  In this manner, many different 
agencies can develop an integrated plan to achieve a common purpose. 
4. Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction: Quarterly 
Reports 
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 
established the SIGAR (NDAA, 2008).  SIGAR’s three key mission areas are as 
follows: (1) to conduct audits and investigations relating to Afghanistan 
reconstruction operations; (2) to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in 
operations and programs; and (3) to keep the secretary of state and the secretary of 
defense informed about current or potential problems and deficiencies (NDAA, 
2008). 
SIGAR submits a quarterly report to Congress to summarize key activities, 
audits, and investigations. The reports also provide an overview of reconstruction 
activities in Afghanistan and include a detailed statement of all obligations, 
expenditures, and revenues associated with reconstruction.  The latest SIGAR 
quarterly reports made the following significant CUE observations: 
 Quarterly Report—July 30, 2013: An investigation revealed widespread 
contractor oversight issues across the various contracting agencies 
operating in Afghanistan. Exacerbated by the drawdown of forces, the 
ongoing challenges of oversight by the DoD, Department of State, and 
USAID were highlighted in this report (SIGAR, 2013).  This is important 
to CUE because it highlights the effects of non-cooperation and not 
working towards a common objective. 
 Quarterly Report—October 10, 2012: An audit found that the DoD 
could not accurately account for over $1.1 billion in fuel it provided to 
the Afghanistan National Army. SIGAR learned that no single office 
within the U.S. or Afghan governments had complete records of 
Afghanistan National Army fuel ordered, purchased, delivered, and 
consumed (SIGAR, 2012b).  This report shows the lack of CUE as it 
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highlights the DoD’s challenges in having a centralized system to track 
contract information. 
 Quarterly Report—July 30, 2012: An inspection revealed the Army 
accepted inferior contracted construction that prevented some 
multimillion-dollar border police bases from being used as intended.  
One of SIGAR’s recommendations was for the Army to ensure the 
contractor has developed an effective contractor quality control 
program, which is adequately monitored and assessed (SIGAR, 
2012a).  Although not directly related to CUE, this could have been 
addressed with interagency cooperation working towards the common 
objective of reducing waste. 
These reports, investigations, and findings all revealed serious problems 
across the contracting support spectrum.  Ultimately, problems in planning, 
oversight, and management led to billions of dollars of waste and fraud in OIF and 
OEF. 
5. Government Accountability Office 
Over the past decade, the GAO has produced several reports to address the 
challenges faced with OCS.  Since the early 1990s, the GAO has identified the 
DoD’s contract management as a high-risk area (GAO, 2010).  The following GAO 
reports identify key concerns associated with OCS and related CUE challenges. 
 GAO Report 10-829T, Waterfight Support: Cultural Change Needed to 
Improve How DOD Plans for and Manages Operational Contract 
Support (GAO, 2010): This 2010 report identified several steps to 
institutionalize OCS within the DoD.  Key steps relating to CUE include 
developing joint OCS polices, planning for contractors in ongoing and 
future operations, tracking contractor personnel and providing 
oversight, training acquisition personnel, and developing a department-
wide lessons learned program. 
 GAO Report 12-1026T, Operational Contract Support: Sustained DOD 
Leadership Needed to Better Prepare for Future Contingencies (GAO, 
2012): This report found three main areas for DoD leadership to focus 
on in order to prepare for the next contingency operation: (1) planning 
for OCS to help the DoD clarify priorities and unify towards common 
objectives; (2) having the right people (acquisition and non-acquisition) 
with the right skills to effectively manage OCS; and (3) improving the 
tools to account for contracts and contractors. 
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 GAO Report 13-212, DOD Needs Additional Steps to Fully Integrate 
Operational Contract Support Into Contingency Planning (GAO, 2013): 
This recent report made several recommendations regarding the 
DoD’s effort to integrate OCS into contingency planning.  The four 
overarching recommendations all work to increase the 
institutionalization of OCS and indirectly increase CUE during 
contingency operations: (1) the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force 
provide OCS planning guidance; (2) the Joint Staff provide OCS 
training for all planners; (3) joint planners broaden their focus to 
include areas beyond logistics; and (4) OCS expertise and education is 
offered to service components.   
These key reports from the last three years highlight the DoD’s challenges in 
integrating OCS and its continued efforts to improve this capability.  Our 
interviewees echoed many of the recommendations mentioned in these reports. 
 OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT E.
OCS is a strategic capability that is rapidly changing and adapting to lessons 
learned from Iraq and Afghanistan.  This section focuses on defining OCS, 
examining congressional legislative policies and DoD directives that have 
revolutionized OCS over the last decade, and, finally, discussing significant OCS 
initiatives that are important in meeting today’s merging capability requirements.   
1. What Is Operational Contract Support? 
Lacking formal doctrine prior to 2008, the contracting community fell short in 
its planning and integration of contract support at the joint operational level.  
Although the military had used contract support since the onset of wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, Joint Publication 4-10 (JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support; 
CJCS, 2008) was the first publication to address joint doctrine.  The purpose of JP 4-
10 was to provide the joint OCS staff with tools for planning, conducting, and 
accessing OCS within a joint operations environment.  JP 4-10 (CJCS, 2008) 
defined successful OCS as the “ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision 
of integrated contracted support and management of contractor personnel providing 
that support to the joint force in a designated operational area” (p. I-2). This first 
version of JP 4-10 was significant because it standardized information and guidance 
for improving operational contract management. 
Over the past five years, OCS has evolved to meet new challenges from the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  As such, the DoD is currently revising JP 4-10 with an 
anticipated release date of early FY2014.  This new JP 4-10 (CJCS, 2012a), which 
begin the revision process in 2012, defines OCS as  
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the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services and 
construction from commercial sources in support of CCDR directed 
operations along with the associated contingency contracting and 
associated contractor personnel management functions.  It is important 
to note that OCS applies to the full range of military operations to 
include contract operation to Phase 0. (p. 6)  
Unlike the older definition, this update from previous definitions acknowledges 
“associated contingency contracting” and gives more attention to the contractor by 
emphasizing “personnel management functions.” Additionally, this definition stresses 
the importance of Phase 0 planning.  According to Yoder, Long, and Nix’s (2012) 
Phase Zero Contracting Operations, the top-level planner is known as the integrated 
planner and executor (IPE) contingency contracting officer.  Having the highest 
training and experience, this IPE should be placed and involved at the joint staff or 
strategic planning levels to assist with Phase 0 planning efforts (Yoder et  al., 2012).  
It is at these strategic levels that the IPE can effectively assist with annex W 
development and other various OCS-related activities.  The annex W is the primary 
way commanders and their staffs integrate OCS into planning and is defined as 
follows: 
[The Annex W] is the primary means used by … planners to document 
OCS in OPLANs [operational plans]/OPORDs [operations orders].  The 
Annex W is normally required for all CONPLANs [concept plans] with 
TPFDD [time-phased force and deployment data], OPLANs, and 
OPORDs, but usually not required for GCC’s [geographical combat 
command’s] Commander’s Estimates, BPLANs [base plans], and 
CONPLANs without TPFDD.  The level of detail included in Annex W 
varies based on information available and level of command. (CJCS, 
2012a, p. 44)   
According to a GAO (2013) report, there were 45 approved annex Ws of the 
95 plans reviewed.  This is seen as a vast improvement over the previous review in 
2010, where only four of 89 plans included approved annex Ws (GAO, 2013). 
Created in 2011, the J4 Operational Contract Support Services Division (J4 
OCSSD) helps institutionalize OCS across the elements of DOTMLPF–P.  According 
to J4 OCSSD, OCS can be defined as “the ability to plan, orchestrate and 
synchronize the provision of contract support integration, contracting support, and 
contractor management.  These three functions are inextricably linked to achieving 
favorable operational and acquisition outcomes” (C. D. Driscoll, personal 
communication, June 24, 2013; see Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Operational Contract Support Functions  
(C. D. Driscoll, personal communication, June 24, 2013) 
Developed by J4 OCSSD, Figure 9 is a depiction of OCS that is logically 
organized with three supporting functions.  According to this figure, contract support 
integration (CSI), contracting support (CS), and contractor management (CM) are all 
required in order to conduct OCS.  The rings tie these functions to illustrate the 
overlapping of the capabilities, and when used properly, the results are efficient and 
effective CS (C. D. Driscoll, personal communication, June 24, 2013). 
2. Evolution of Operational Contract Support  
Prior to the drawdown of military forces in the mid-1990s, the United States 
was able to sustain itself with its own organic capabilities.  As the Cold War ended 
and the Soviet Union was no longer seen as a threat to our national security, the 
DoD began decreasing its forces by diminishing its military infrastructure and logistic 
capabilities footprint.  According to a recent Congressional Research Study report 
(Schwartz & Swain, 2011), this loss in capability made the military dependent on 
contract support.  Schwartz and Swain (2011) further concluded that “after the Cold 
War, reliance on contractors further increased when DOD cut logistic and support 
personnel” (p. 1).  As a result of these cuts, “DOD lost in-house capability and was 
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forced to rely even further on contractor support” (Schwartz & Swain, 2011, p. 1).  In 
addition to this diminished logistic support, military doctrine did not adapt to support 
this capability gap.  Ultimately, this deficiency led to an inefficient contracting 
process that was exacerbated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
3. Congressional Legislation  
Prior to 2007, there was very little legislation concerning OCS.  The Gansler 
Commission report, numerous GAO findings, and inspectors general studies 
provided the backdrop for Congress to hold oversight hearings and enact legislation 
aimed at improving OCS.  Key congressional legislation affecting OCS over the last 
few years is summarized here. 
 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2007: This act was 
important because it was the first time Congress directed the DoD to 
“develop joint policies for requirements definition, contingency program 
management, and contingency contracting during combat operations 
and post-conflict operations” (Schwartz & Church, 2013, p. 28).  
 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2008: This act was 
significant to CUE for three reasons: (1) it first authorized the inspector 
general (IG) office to perform audits on contracts with Iraq and 
Afghanistan; (2) it authorized the first tools to track theater-wide 
contractors through the Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational 
Tracker (SPOT); and (3) it mandated contingency contracting training 
for non-acquisition DoD personnel under the Joint Professional Military 
Education (JPME; Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense–
Program Support [OSD P&S], 2012). 
 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2009: The NDAA 2009 
was relevant to CUE because it established senior officers’ billets, and 
policies that provided guidance to ensure the acquisition workforce is 
properly trained and developed.  Most importantly, it assigned 
personnel to the right positions, and it finally incorporated a 
government-wide contingency contracting corps to facilitate 
emergency, major disaster, and contingency operations (Schwartz & 
Church, 2013).    
 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2011: This act was 
important to CUE because it established policy, assigned 
responsibilities, and provided procedures for the regulation of the 
selection, accountability, training, equipping, and conduct of private 
security contractor (PSC) functions under a covered contract during 
contingency operations, humanitarian or peace operations, or other 
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military operations or exercises.  It also assigned responsibilities and 
established procedures for incident reporting, use of and accountability 
for equipment, rules for the use of force, and a process for 
administrative action or the removal, as appropriate, of PSCs and PSC 
personnel (Schwartz & Church, 2013).    
 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2012: The NDAA 2012 
was relevant to the CUE because it amended the Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), which allowed 
contracting officials to access contractor and subcontractor records 
within CENTCOM.  Additionally, it facilitated a single contracting 
authority capability to support overseas contracting (Schwartz & 
Church, 2013).    
 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2013: This recent act 
further improved contracting efficiencies and effectiveness within OCS.  
First, it required COCOMs to develop a risk management strategy for 
all operational and contingency plans.  Second, it designated a single 
contracting authority for domestic “reachback” capabilities to support 
overseas contracting.  Third, it required the DoD to issue and develop 
guidance on responsibility and authority for the planning and executing 
of OCS contingency functions.  Fourth, it required the insertion of OCS 
within the DoD’s planning, joint professional military education, and 
management structure. Finally, it mandated the establishment and 
maintenance of a database on price trends of items and services 
(Schwartz & Church, 2013).  
The increase in lawmakers’ interest provided the statutory framework for 
institutionalizing OCS across the DoD services.  As a result of these NDAAs, the 
DoD issued several key policies designed to improve OCS and increase CUE within 
CENTCOM’s AOR. 
4. DoD Policies 
Prior to 2005, there were no comprehensive DoD policies pertaining to OCS.  
As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted the need for additional OCS 
guidance, the DoD began issuing several key policies affecting OCS and related 
CUE concerns.  The following policies are significant in that they improve OCS 
activities and aid in achieving better CUE in the CENTCOM AOR:  
 Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3020.41: This DoDI was 
key because it was the first DoD policy to provide comprehensive OCS 
guidance.  It established procedures for contractor personnel 
authorized to accompany the U.S. Armed Forces (CAAF).  Prior to 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 30 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
2005 there were no DoD policy-recognizing contractors on the 
battlefield (OUSD[AL&T], 2005). 
 Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3020.49: This directive 
was significant because the policy gave guidance and assigned 
responsibilities for leading OCS efforts to include OCS planning, 
organizing, staffing, and executing to meet the joint force commanders 
objectives  (OUSD[AL&T], 2009). 
 DoDI 1100.22: This instruction was significant because it updated the 
DoD’s policy and procedures for determining workforce mix through 
manpower criteria and guidance of military, DoD civilian, and private-
sector support (OUSD[AL&T], 2010). 
 DoDI 3020.41 Revision: This key policy updated the 2005 policy 
authorizing contractors to accompany the force.  It also established 
and defined the roles and responsibilities for managing OCS 
(OUSD[AL&T], 2011). 
 DoD CJCSM 3130.03, 2012: This document is essential because it 
updated joint OCS policy in many non-logistical functional areas, such 
as intelligence, personnel, and engineering (Schwartz & Church, 
2013).  
 JP 4-10 (Revision pending): This document will improve on the 2008 
version of JP 4-10 and incorporate many of the recent OCS lessons 
learned (CJCS, 2012a).   
As a result of DoD policies, legislation, and evolving doctrine, the DoD 
continues to improve OCS capability for the current and future fight.  These policies 
and legislation not only improved the contracting management of OCS, but they also 
provided oversight and transparency in order for staff to better support the 
commanders and their staff through efficient and effective processes.  A summary of 
the key OCS documents is depicted in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10. Key Operational Contract Support Documents 
 CONCLUSION  F.
In this chapter, we provided a background for C–JTSCC and examined 
published research, government reports, DoD policies, and various acquisition 
professional journals and newsletters to gain an understanding of how the C–JTSCC 
has evolved.  We first examined the concept of unity of effort and its importance to 
contracting in the CENTCOM AOR.  Next, we presented the history and evolution of 
C–JTSCC from its beginnings in Iraq and Afghanistan to its predecessor 
organization, JCC–I/A.  Then, we examined key literature that addressed OCS 
lessons learned, observations, and findings. Finally, we provided key documents 
that shed light on the development of OCS.       
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This chapter contains selected raw data collected from our in-depth 
interviews.  We determined that we would need to conduct qualitative interviews with 
individuals who were knowledgeable and/or experienced with contingency 
contracting in the CENTCOM AOR.  This approach allowed us to gain detailed 
information and examples from our respondents. Our primary tool for gathering 
these data was an in-depth interview style called responsive interviewing.  This 
interview style “emphasizes searching for context and richness while accepting the 
complexity and ambiguity of real life” (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). 
To maintain depth and clarity, we remained flexible within IRB protocol and 
listened more than talked. Taking a semi-structured approach, we always began our 
interviews with our main research question but tailored our subsequent questions 
based on the responses of our interviewees.  In order to keep the interviews on 
target or seek clarification, we often introduced probing responses or questions.   
Follow-up questions were directly related to our primary and subsidiary 
questions, and were used to seek further detail and clarification on significant 
concepts, themes, and ideas.  Upon completion of our interviews, we had our 
recordings transcribed.  The following sections are the raw data responses to our 
primary question and subsequent questions.  Each of the following headings 
corresponds to one of our specific research questions and the interviewees’ 
responses to those questions.  Individual interviewee responses are in no particular 
order. 
 PRIMARY QUESTION ONE B.
This project’s primary research question, “How can we achieve better 
contracting unity of effort in the CENTCOM AOR,” was intended to address the lack 
of CUE and associated efficiency and effectiveness from the existing disparate 
number of contracting authorities operating in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.  With 
this context in mind, the interviewees’ relevant thoughts and opinions on the matter 
are provided in this section. 
Primary Question 1: How can we achieve better contracting unity of 
effort in the CENTCOM AOR? 
Response from Contracting Professional, office of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary (Contracting), Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition): 
[Organization]: I believe we should be focused on achieving overall 
unity of effort for the operation and not necessarily on achieving 
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contracting unity of effort.  These are not necessarily the same thing 
and achieving better contracting unity of effort may actually be counter 
to overall unity of effort for certain operations.  If I’m trying to achieve 
better contracting unity of effort, the best way to do this is to have 
command and control (C2) of all contracting within a JOA [joint 
operation area].  This allows for the integration of all service/agency 
contracting authority under a single head of contracting activity (HCA) 
and command structure.  However, doing this means you create two 
separate C2 structures for executing BOS, and base/installation 
commanders no longer have C2 of a critical enabling capability 
(contracting) needed to accomplish their assigned missions.   
This does not mean that achieving better contracting unity of 
effort and overall unity of effort for the operation will never parallel each 
other.  In operations where economic lines of operation are most 
critical to mission accomplishment, achieving unity of contracting effort 
by having a separate contracting C2 structure may be consistent with 
achieving overall unity of effort for the operation.  In operations where 
military lines of operation are most critical to mission accomplishment, 
achieving unity of contracting effort by having a separate contracting 
C2 structure can actually be counter-productive to achieving overall 
unity of effort for the operation.   
Therefore, the focus should always be on achieving overall unity 
of effort for the operation and not necessarily contracting unity of effort.  
How we organize within CENTCOM or any GCC really depends on the 
operation and whether the economic lines of operation or military lines 
of operation are most critical to mission accomplishment.   
[Managing, process, and authority]: Since OCS is a multi-
functional enabling capability and is not owned by a single functional 
area, it’s much easier to manage if you can break it down into its 
process elements and have accountability for each element.  Like most 
processes, OCS consists of three basic elements: inputs 
(requirements), processing (contracting), and outputs (contractors).   
Planning for and executing OCS requirements and contractor 
support/oversight is controlled via command authority while planning 
for and executing contracting is controlled via contracting authority.  
Therefore, you must hold the command chain accountable for OCS 
requirements management and contractor support/oversight and you 
must hold heads of contracting activities (HCAs) accountable for 
contracting.  Too many times we lump all of these basic elements 
together and call it OCS and then try to hold the HCA accountable for 
all of OCS even though the HCA does not own or manage the 
requirements nor do they provide or control the contracting officer 
representatives (CORs) who coordinate contractor support and 
provide/document contractor performance oversight. 
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OCS requirements are the inputs in the process, and managing 
these inputs, which are controlled via command authority, is essential 
in achieving overall unity of effort and successfully integrating and 
synchronizing OCS.  It’s like the old saying, “Garbage in, garbage out!”  
We must proactively manage contract support requirements by 
planning for them and establishing an efficient/effective structure for 
execution to validate, prioritize, and consolidate when appropriate.  We 
also have to determine which requirements need to be centrally 
managed JOA-wide and which can be managed at the 
base/installation level.  For those centrally managed JOA-wide 
requirements, it’s imperative to identify who is responsible for 
managing them to know who to hold accountable.   
The real thing we struggle with is that OCS requirements are 
owned by every functional area (logistics, intelligence, operations, 
communications, etc.), and there is no designated organization on the 
GCC/JTF [joint task force]/service component staffs to establish 
structure and accountability for OCS requirements and contractor 
oversight/support.  We need a multi-functional organization/cell 
properly staffed with personnel who are trained in OCS to do this.  
In addition, it is impossible to determine how best to organize 
the processing element (contracting) until we know the type of 
operation and how OCS requirements will be managed.  As 
mentioned, it really depends on the criticality of the economic lines of 
operation in determining which contracting organization structure is 
most appropriate.  In many operations, a hybrid organization structure 
may be most appropriate.  For example, centrally managed JOA-wide 
requirements may be executed by a JTSCC [joint theater support 
contracting demand] and decentralized BOS requirements may be 
executed by the service designated the BOS lead for a specific 
temporary base/location.   
To do this, we need to identify which OCS requirements need to 
be managed JOA-wide at the operational level to  centralize control of 
the requirements, enforce JOA-wide standards, prevent competition for 
limited resources, take advantage of economies of scale, etc.  Assume 
we decide to centrally manage OCS requirements for power 
generation equipment, security services, theater-wide transportation, 
information operations, MILCON [military construction], bottled water, 
containerized housing units, etc.  Managing OCS requirements JOA-
wide helps avoid duplication of effort and allows the combatant 
commander to exercise directive authority for logistics (DAFL) for OCS.   
All other requirements can then be executed in a decentralized 
manner at the base/installation level whereby the contracting activity is 
under the C2 of the base/installation commander.  This empowers the 
base/installation commander with the enabling capabilities necessary 
to fully accomplish their mission.  Also, if external contracts, such as 
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LOGCAP, are properly delegated to the BOS contracting activity, the 
base/installation commander has the ability to exercise some type of 
control over the OCS supporting BOS for that base/installation.  When 
it’s time to drawdown operations and close the bases, this becomes 
very important.    
Finally, the most important thing required for effective 
management of OCS requirements and contractor support/oversight is 
culture change whereby commanders and non-contracting functionals 
[personnel] recognize and embrace their roles/responsibilities in 
executing OCS.  Commanders rely primarily on military, civilians, and 
contractors to accomplish their mission.  They still own the portion of 
their mission that is accomplished by contract support.  Therefore, they 
have to properly plan for managing contract support to include 
requirements as well as contractor support/oversight. (Air Force 
contracting professional, personal communication, June 27, 2013) 
Response from William (Bill) Reich, Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics: 
[Theater business clearance (TBC)]: So if you go back to 2007, 
General Scott was the commander of JCC–I/A and he was having 
trouble with contractors showing up all around in theater.  No one knew 
who they were or where they came from … and they needed support.  
From 2007 to today, there has been a series of updates to TBC (see 
TBC memo dated 27 July 2012).  It is really a tool any combatant 
commander can use. So, at this point in time, I would say that TBC is 
really focused on what I would call the mechanical aspects.  Basically 
just ensuring compliance with the commander’s requirements and 
whatever information and data they want to collect. 
So, basically, if you had a contract or a quote for performance 
in, for example, Afghanistan, (1) you need to go look at FAR 225.74 1, 
which talks about requirements for foreign acquisition; and (2) there’s a 
checklist in there about all the things that you need to make sure your 
requiring activity does.  [For example], you need to comply with the 
business clearance requirement and then it references you to 
CENTCOM webpage.   
[CASM]: Nirvana to me would be the use of the Contingency 
Acquisition Support Module (CASM). CASM could be required DoD-
wide, and it complies with procurement data standards.  It could allow 
you to do the Theater Business Clearance (TBC) back when that 
requirement package is being built.  That’s a huge deal because you 
could figure out where in the workflow that belonged and make it part 
of the workflow such that before it’s even approved TBC has already 
been done. You would avoid the need to do TBC. (W. Reich, personal 
communication, June 26, 2013) 
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Response from Major General Camille Nichols, Commanding General, 
Army Contracting Command: 
[Authority]: A commander, at certain phases of operation should be 
given certain levels of authority ... or better the COCOM [Combatant 
Command] could retain that authority.  But someone has to have the 
authority and someone needs to direct the services and other agencies 
to do certain things.  You need to have the overarching intent of the 
doctrine and then the functional execution should be situation 
dependent. 
So, whichever service is the lead for contracting must be able to 
direct everyone in DoD to do certain things in support of a senior 
mission functional contracting commander, whatever service it is. (C. 
Nichols, personal communication, July 8, 2013) 
Response from Craig Spisak, Director of the U.S. Army’s Acquisition 
Support Center: 
[Doctrine]: In a perfect world, your solution would be there if there was 
only one contracting agency in theater.  And that contracting agency 
was properly resourced to do all the necessary contracting and 
everybody who was in theater knew that if they wanted something 
done, that’s where they had to go. Now, if that existed, the problem 
would go away.  So, how do you solve it?  You find all the things that 
prevent that from existing.  To me that is the disparate authorities to 
have people in theater doing contracting.  You can easily solve that 
with policy.  You really want to have it institutionalized.  To me, that’s 
doctrine. (C. A. Spisak, personal communication, May 9, 2013) 
Response from Brigadier General Joseph Bass, Acting Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement): 
[Procurement authority]: If you really want unity of effort, you’d use the 
COCOM commander—the procurement authority comes through the 
COCOM for his theater and then he could put out policy and those 
kinds of things that say that you can’t execute a contract in my theater.   
We don’t tell an infantry brigade ... take your missions from 
home station, but report to Afghanistan.  We wouldn’t do that with any 
other function, but in contracting we decide the process is to report 
back to wherever your authority came from.  It doesn’t make sense to 
me.  It would be cleaner to have a single line of procurement authority 
aligned with the command authority ... Then the COCOM CDR is 
responsible for everything in his AOR. 
I think it seems logical to me.  If you want unity of effort, you 
have the procurement authority flow through the combatant 
commander, and then he’s responsible for the procurements in his 
AOR.  If somebody else comes in the AOR, at least he can hold them 
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accountable because he’s the commander.  You can’t have the 
contracting commander trying to hold somebody accountable that’s not 
under their command.  We have to go back to the combatant 
commander and try to get them to help us, and that’s why it’s hard to 
get that unity of effort. (J. L. Bass, personal communication, June 24, 
2013) 
Response from Charles (Chuck) Maurer, Doctrine Branch Chief, 
Acquisition Logistics & Technology Integration Office:  
[Doctrine]: There is future work with the JTSCC, which is called the 
Theater Support Contracting Construct.  It is about both unity of 
command within certain aspects of the contracting world, but more 
importantly unity of effort and leveraging a JTSCC to do that.  At the 
end of the day, JTSCC is an optional construct … because there are 
both command and coordination constructs that are applicable to 
certain types of operations.   
Nowhere in current or revised doctrine do we ever discuss an 
AOR-wide JTSCC.  The JTSCC, as we know it, has been really 
schizophrenic when it comes to that. Remember it was JCC–I/A? But 
yet they supported two JOAs … a significant violation of the principle of 
unity of command.  They had some problems with that.  Then they 
pulled it up to the  combatant commander level and now it is a direct 
supporting subordinate joint force for the combatant command, yet 
only has contracting authority in one joint operations area.  Again this 
command arrangement is not joint doctrine.  More specifically, JP 4-10 
stipulates a JTSCC normally operates at the JOA or the JFC type 
level.   
Doctrinally a JTSCC is a functionally focused JTF, but in the 
purest doctrinal sense is not a functional component command like the 
JFLCC [Joint Force Land Component Commander].  The JTSCC only 
commands theater support contracting elements. ... This is the key 
point and this has not changed in the revised JP 4-10 drafts.  It does 
not command any other contracting outfit or have contracting authority 
over any other contracting outfit other than itself.   
JTSCC’s second mission-essential task is all about coordinating 
common contracting actions that may be competing for the same local 
vendor base or be duplicative to contracts already in place.  The 
revised JP 4-10 says explicitly that for every joint operation, the 
combatant commander should designate a lead service for contracting 
coordination.  So you have got some type of [Joint Contracting Support 
Board] JCSB process identified with a leader and combatant 
command-designated contracting organizations required to participate.  
You need to have a [Lead Service for Contracting] LSC where one 
service provides all theater support contracts to the joint force, [Lead 
Service for Contract Coordination] LSCC, or a JTSCC construct.  You 
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need one of those three in every joint operation to ensure there is 
some type of common contracting coordination.  At a minimum a 
rudimentary JSCB that is only looking maybe at certain functions at 
certain thresholds, but at least establish that. (C. Maurer, personal 
communication, June 26, 2013) 
Response from Rear Admiral Nicholas Kalathas, Deputy Director 
Contingency Contracting, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy:  
[Lessons learned and planning]: We are starting to figure out that we 
need to study what we have done.  We haven’t studied it.  Every 
COCOM has got a shoebox full of lessons learned.  I’ve got them; 
everybody has got them.  We have never looked at all the lessons 
learned and actually compared them.  We have done no analysis.  I 
really think that everybody has got lessons learned, but nobody has 
really vetted those lessons learned to see if we really learned anything.  
Every geographic combatant command has experienced a 
contingency.  Let’s get the baseline and figure out the common 
denominators.  Imagine how much easier it would be to prosecute the 
next contingent operation if we had a plan and if that plan was based 
on lessons learned. 
[Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB)]: Do you really want just 
one command contracting for everything?  The reason why it works out 
that way is really how we operate now.  I mean, the PEOs [program 
executive officers] do what the PEOs do.  They have the folks that buy 
the systems.  That is what they do.  You don’t want anybody else 
buying that stuff.  Does it really make sense for me to go do aircraft 
maintenance on C-130s when the Air Force has been doing it for 
years, they know what they are doing.  Likewise, you don’t want me 
taking over the port operations in Bahrain for the 5th Fleet.  My 
contingency contracting folks don’t do that for a living.  So the 
commander really does need a common site picture for all the 
requirements that are coming up in his sandbox.  That goes back to 
requirements with an integration cell concept or the JARB process. (N. 
T. Kalathas, personal communication, June 27, 2013) 
Response from Victor Solero, Joint Contracting Acquisition Support 
Office Planner, U.S. Central Command: 
[Lead service for contracting]: The intent of a JTSCC is basically for 
long-term complex operations. We don’t necessarily foresee, at least in 
all our planning efforts here, anything long-term.  We would basically 
go through a lead service for contracting (LSC) construct.  There would 
be a lead service identified, and then maybe down the road if and 
when it’s determined this is going to take a lot longer, it’s getting a lot 
more complex, and it’s a lot bigger, then we need to go ahead and 
morph into a JTSCC.  Both the Air Force and the Army, obviously, 
they’ve got the bulk of the contracting assets and the expertise, and 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 40 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
they are already working towards, sort of building a foundation for 
having a JTSCC. So maybe the [Contract Support Brigade] CSB from 
an Army perspective would go in and then that would be the nucleus 
for a JTSCC.  But in the initial stages, it would just be a lead service. 
One of the things that has confused people, for instance, when 
we talk about constructs and say, “Hey, you’re the lead service for 
contracting,” well, everybody seems to think, “Well, does that mean I 
have to contract for everybody?”  That is not the case.  That was never 
meant to be.  The lead service is supposed to be to support their own 
service and to synchronize and coordinate all the contracting actions in 
the CJOA [combined/joint operations area] to make sure that 
everybody is leveraging the contracts that already are in place without 
necessarily setting up new ones ... No duplication of effort. 
[Synchronization cell]: I think the wave of the future is some kind 
of synchronization cell … and when COCOM commander says, “I want 
this to be my contracting thing,” then the integration cell says, “Okay, 
we’ll help integrate.”  They help set it up, and do all the things 
necessary to stand it up.  Obviously, if you’ve already got an 
organization already structured to do those kinds of things then they 
would basically form the nucleus.  So it would most likely be a 
contracting support brigade or an Air Force contracting squadron. (V. 
Solero, personal communication, June 26, 2013) 
Response from Lynn Connors, Acquisition Operations Specialist, Joint 
Contingency Acquisition Support Office: 
[Lessons learned and training]: You have to realize and remember how 
C–JTSCC was created in the first place and then take those lessons 
and try to either create that standing JTSCC template so that way you 
can pull it off the shelf and then you can man it.  There really is no 
career field for OCS. ... That’s part of the problem. 
Over the last 10 years, we’ve had a lot of initiatives as far as 
training, and education, and joint exercises.  JCASO has an exercise 
planner assigned to the JS J7 Joint Exercise Division (South) and is 
responsible for developing OCS training events into the Combatant 
Command-sponsored joint exercise program (JEP).   
OCS is not a career field.  The idea of establishing an OCS 
accreditation program is possible.  A way to go about that would be to 
weave together programs that currently exist from DAU [Defense 
Acquisition University], JKO, and Army Logistics University (ALU), and 
JS J4 OCS Services Division, and identify an organization to manage 
the requirements and issue the certifications.  Since there is no overall 
organization for OCS training, finding an organization to manage the 
certification is a challenge.  Organizations for consideration could 
include  National Defense University, deputy assistant of secretary of 
defense (program support), USD(AT&L), director of defense 
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procurement and acquisition policy (DPAP), Defense Acquisition 
University, etc.   
Currently, JCASO has core and functional training for their 
personnel.  The training is similar to an OCS certification.  The training 
includes distance learning courses from JKO, DAU, and SPOT 
[Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker] webinar 
training.  Core training is for all personnel and consists of 17 hours of 
training.  Courses review OCS doctrine, contracting basics, 
interagency, and Synchronized Pre-deployment Operations Tracker 
(SPOT).  Functional training is in addition to core training and focuses 
on keeping our planners, logisticians, engineers, and quality assurance 
personnel current.  Planners take 18 hours of distance learning in 
contracting and operations from JKO and DAU and 80 hours of 
resident training at the newly established Joint OCS Planning & 
Execution Course (JOPEC) offered by the JS J4 OCS Services 
Division.  Engineers take four hours of distance learning in operations 
(JKO) and 40 hours of resident training at the Naval Civil Engineer 
Corps Officers School.  Logisticians take five hours of distance 
learning in operations (JKO) and 80 hours of resident training at the 
JOPEC course.  Our quality assurance specialists take 36 hours of 
distance learning courses from JKO and DAU in operations, joint 
logistics, and contracting officer’s representative (COR) training.   
The JCASO training program can be offered as a type of 
certification program for non-acquisition personnel.  It is now a 
requirement by the Joint Chief of Staff to teach OCS and that was in 
the NDAA fiscal year language. Section 845, NDAA 2013, [titled] 
Inclusion of OCS in certain requirements for DoD planning, joint 
professional military education (JPME), and management structure, 
[requires the] DoD to measure, on an annual basis the capability of 
OCS to support current and anticipate wartime missions of the armed 
forces.  [It also] adds OCS to JPME [and requires] the USDAT&L, 
secretaries of military departments, the heads of the defense agencies, 
and commanders of combatant commands to determine the OCS 
requirements of the armed forces and resources to improve and 
enhance OCS for armed forces and planning for OCS.  (L. Conner, 
personal communication, June 26, 2013) 
Response from Major General Harold Greene, Deputy for Acquisition 
and Systems Management, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, 
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology: 
[Control measures]: It’s a command responsibility, and you can’t fix a 
command problem with a staff organization unless the command who 
owns it is putting out the policy and there is a doctrine that underpins it 
that makes it all work.  The purpose of CJTSCC being there is to 
provide a capabilities service, a function, to support the operational 
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commanders’ need.  So I think you’ve got to go back to starting with 
the operational commander and where are those requirements coming 
from and having appropriate control measures in place. 
What you’re really talking about is contracting monitoring 
actions.  They don’t necessarily even have control over the 
requirements, and so it’s tough for them to monitor unless they’re given 
that role and there’s a policy from the appropriate command that says, 
“To all of you who are making requirements that drive the need for 
contractors, you have to do these things and that includes coordination 
with C–JTSCC for these things.”  As with anything else, you have to 
have management controls.  We know you’re going to have lots of 
contractors on the battlefield ... so go back to the source of the 
requirement.  What is the source of the requirement?  It would be really 
easy if you could say that all contracting goes through the C–JTSCC, 
but that’s not realistic. 
If you had a troop unit come in, you’d damn sure know where 
they were.  You’d have them on a map and you’d be tracking and it 
would be commander’s business. Okay, so now what’s our solution to 
field our contractors?  What control measures did you put in place in 
the contract in your organizational structure with the COR to report 
back how many are here, where they are, and what they’re doing? It’s 
not the C–JTSCC’s business. … It’s that of commander and his staff.  
Unless he says, “C-JTSCC, you’re my special staff officer responsible 
for tracking this and here’s the OPORD and it has all of the staff and 
subordinate elements on how you will support that mission. (H. J. 
Greene, personal communication, July 11, 2013) 
Response from Colonel Mike Hoskin, Division Chief, Operational 
Contract Support and Services, Joint Staff, J-4: 
[Planning and OCS exercise]: A lot of it starts with planning.  Eighteen 
months ago, the GAO reported that there were only two annex Ws in 
existence. During the last 18 months we have focused on this 
challenge and currently have about 50% of the problem solved.  For 
example, PACOM [Pacific Command] and NORTHCOM [Northern 
Command] have both requested shelf ready like FRAGOs and orders 
that they can pull off the shelf in times of a national emergency to give 
them specific contracting authorities.  Increasing unity of effort and 
unity of command starts with the actual plans.  The plan should 
stipulate that when a particular event or trigger happens, we will go to 
lead service for contracting or to a JTSCC.  We will be exercising this 
concept and standing up a JTSCC in the JAN 2014 exercise with 
NORTHCOM.   
If a JTSCC is decided upon, unity of effort and unity of 
command are increased within DoD.  In the CENTCOM AOR, there 
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are challenges with multiple contracting organizations, but coordination 
is better today than in the past.    
[Directive authority for contracting]: I’ll give you an example of 
where C2 was done very, very quickly and the problems we ran into 
and how we fixed them.  During Operation Tomodachi, much of Hawaii 
was alerted and took precautionary actions to a potential tsunami 
hitting the islands.  Colonel Jay Carlson (USAF counterpart in Hawaii) 
and I quickly assessed the situation and decided that command and 
control of contracting should be quickly established because we both 
expected the United States to quickly flow forces to Japan to assist in 
this natural disaster.  Based on long-standing agreements that the 
USAF would conduct the majority of the contracting in Japan, it made 
sense to declare the USAF as the lead service for contracting in 
support of Operation Tomodachi.  We quickly informed PACOM and 
assisted PACOM with issuing the contracting C2 FRAGO.  The 
FRAGO and contracting command and control were instrumental in 
working the requirements and managing scarce resources.  
One of the services initially did not want to follow the command 
and control FRAGO but quickly came on board when the humanitarian 
funds were tied to the JRRB [joint requirement review board], 
organized by contracting leadership, PACOM, and USAID.  (M. Hoskin, 
personal communication, June 24, 2013) 
Response from Dan Matthews, Policy and Doctrine Analyst, Office 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement), Expeditionary 
Contracting Support Plans Directorate: 
[OCS joint concept and integration]: I think it’s probably a little late to 
do defibrillation on JTSCC, but let’s talk about the concept.  It’s an 
OCS joint concept that’s tied to the new national strategy that’s tied to 
the chairman’s drive to do the joint force 2020 thing of how do we 
support the force in the future for expeditionary and contingency 
operations given the fact that because of the national strategy we are 
not going to be a stabilizing force?  In other words, we’re not going to 
do nation building with U.S. forces like Iraq and Afghanistan, to some 
extent, and not size the force to do that. 
Let’s go back to Gansler [Report] in 2007.  It specifically 
earmarked the Army and said, “There’s an institutional side of the 
Army, if you will ... and an operational side of the Army, and we need 
to make sure we integrate those efforts.”  I’m not sure we’re there yet 
in the Army.  We’re better than we were in 2007, but it’s not just the 
JTSCC.  I think it’s an overall DoD capability or mentality about the 
capability itself and the understanding of it. (C. D. Matthews, personal 
communication, June 24, 2013) 
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Response from Brigadier General Theodore Harrison, Commanding 
General United States Army Expeditionary Contracting Command: 
[Theater business clearance]: This issue is something that I really 
struggled with as I was coming back from JCC–I in 2006 … and I teed 
up this very issue with DPAP.  As a result of a briefing I gave to Mr. 
Assad, the DAR [Defense Acquisition Regulation] Council finally put 
that clause in the DFAR in terms of contracting performed.  The theater 
business clearance is now a requirement throughout CENTCOM.  That 
never existed before.   
You know it started off just in theater. ... These are contracts 
that we write in JCC–I for performance in Iraq.  Then to compound the 
problem a little bit more, you have got numerous players in theater 
writing contracts.  You have got the State Department, USAID, Corps 
of Engineers, and SOCOM [Special Operations Command] and none 
of these guys belong to us.  Then to really compound the problem you 
have got all these people from outside the area, the external support 
contracts, that are either sort of theater contracts if you will, but being 
written outside.  LOGCAPs are probably, the single best and biggest 
example, ... and then the systems contracts that are even a little bit 
more below the radar or were at the time.   
So that whole concept of theater business clearance came 
about just to help solve some very practical issues.  The contractor that 
shows up with his copy of his contract saying the government will 
provide him full logistics support and he is showing it to the mayor of 
Taji [for example] and saying, “Hey where are my [containerized 
housing units] CHUs?  Of course the mayor doesn’t know anything 
about this.  So you know without having one person in charge of all 
federal government contracting, there is no way you are going to have 
perfect C2 on this.  So the challenge became okay, given we can’t do 
that, what framework can we put in place to try to get at this?  That 
theater business clearance process was our first stab at doing that and 
it has evolved a lot over time. (T. C. Harrison, personal communication, 
August 20, 2013) 
 SUBSIDARY QUESTION TWO  C.
Closely related to our primary research question, many interviewees offered 
their opinions regarding measures C–JTSCC has taken to synchronize their 
contracting activities over the past years.  The intent behind this question was to 
discover C–JTSCC’s current practices at creating unity of effort and the extent to 
which these steps were effective.  Responses from interviewees who covered this 
aspect of unity of effort in their responses to the primary research question are not 
included.   
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Subsidiary Question 2: What steps has C–JTSCC taken to synchronize 
current contracting efforts, and to what extent are they effective?   
Response from Air Force Contracting Professional:   
[TBC]: Some of the biggest challenges we previously faced with OCS 
are (1) we often lacked visibility and accountability for contractors; (2) 
we failed to coordinate with BOS providers at the installation/base level 
to ensure there is adequate government-furnished life support (GFLS) 
available for the contractors; and (3) external and systems support 
contracts lacked the appropriate JOA clauses implementing GCC/JTF 
policies.  Many times contracting is accomplished by a service/agency 
contracting activity outside the AOR, and contractors would just show 
up in the AOR without any coordination with the base/installation 
responsible for providing their life support. 
Therefore, C–JTSCC implemented the theater business 
clearance (TBC) process for external and systems support contracts.  
This process ensures that C–JTSCC reviews solicitations and 
contracts to ensure they include the appropriate local clauses 
implementing GCC/JTF policies.  The TBC process was recently 
amended to ensure there is communication/coordination with BOS 
providers to ensure adequate GFLS is available when contractors 
show up.  C–JTSCC is also accomplishing TBC through the Joint 
Contingency Contract System (JCCS) module and if TBC is not 
accomplished, contractors are unable to get letters of authorization 
(LOAs) issued via the synchronized pre-deployment and operational 
Tracker (SPOT).  Since the LOA is what authorizes a contractor to 
receive GFLS, such as MWR, food, billeting, etc., it helps with 
enforcing the TBC requirement. (Air Force Contracting Professional, 
personal communication, June 27, 2013) 
Response from Major General Camille Nichols: 
[TBC, SPOT, and LOA]: Theater business clearance and SPOT are 
used to align procurement trackers to help codify who had clearance or 
who didn’t.  What we did though was we really took some dramatic 
steps to not allow people in and to remove people who didn’t have a 
validated letter of authorization (LOA), as it related to their contract. 
[JCSB]: The JCSB was the mechanism that I started to try and 
go beyond the community of the willing to give them the perspective on 
the ground where we could do collaboration, and where we could do 
alignment.  So that was my attempt to go a little bit beyond just a 
willingness to share information.  It didn’t go far enough, but it started 
to make some headway. (C. Nichols, personal communication, July 8, 
2013) 
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Response from Brigadier General Joseph Bass: 
[Contract boards]: It’s tough.  You know, we tried by establishing those 
joint contract support boards and the JLPSB, the Joint Logistics 
Procurement Support Board ... Forums to kind of get your arms around 
that.  I was over there in 2007.  You basically hope that everyone will 
cooperate. … It’s like the coalition of the willing.   
[TBC]: Theater business clearance is a policy from CENTCOM 
that says you will not do a contract here without us first approving it.  
You know, you’ve got to send your solicitation and we’re going to make 
sure all the right clauses are in there and then when you get an award 
you’ve got to notify us. That was their attempt to try to get unity of 
effort.  But what if you’re not in DoD?  TBC is okay, … but what if you 
don’t comply?  What happens?  I mean, there really are no teeth to it to 
make people do it. (J. L. Bass, personal communication, June 24, 
2013) 
Response from Charles Maurer:  
[JCSB]: The doctrinal mission for coordination is really the Joint 
Contracting Support Board.  From our office’s view, this effort has been 
a real hit and miss.  The forcing function for that are two things for a 
JCSB.  The first is combatant commander directives.  It directs the 
Service and combat support agency (CSA) contracting organizations to 
participate in the JCSB. Now the problem is that there are many DoD 
contracting organizations, especially those executing external support 
contracts from outside the JOA, that are not under the combatant 
commander’s command. And in all cases, the combatant command 
has no direct control on their contracting authority which is part of the 
challenge in orchestrating contracting in a JOA. 
But talking with the contracting folks and the other people that 
have been involved with OCS, they do believe the JCSB doctrine is 
about right and we have just got to be able to be mature enough to 
make it work.  The combatant commander’s logistical-related directives 
have been problematic when it comes to logistics since the combatant 
commanders were formed because combatant commands, by design, 
don’t have full logistics authority.  The combatant command USC Title 
10 authority is restricted to approving logistical plans and coordinating 
emergency actions while the Service USC Title 10 authorities include 
all aspects of logistics for their forces; … and while DoD continues to 
clarify and emphasize this challenging doctrine, it remains very much 
misunderstood and often a contentious friction point between the 
combatant commands and the services. 
[TBC]: The theater business clearance process was developed 
by the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), Acquisition, Technology, 
& Logistics (AT&L) staff to provide the combatant commander an 
acquisition authority “hammer” to enforce combatant commander OCS-
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related directives. More specifically, OSD(AT&L) has directed that TBC 
“applies to every DoD contracting organization awarding a contract 
with area performance in or delivery to the designated JOA.”    
TBC processes currently being executed in operations in 
Afghanistan are generally restricted to contractor management issues 
with much of the focus on ensuring (1) the appropriate contractor 
employee deployment clause (DFARS 225.74) is in place, and (2) 
synchronizing government-furnished support (GFS) to deployed 
contractor personnel requirements.  TBC in the optimum world 
includes much more than the deployment clause and GFS 
synchronization; it would include a pre-award JCSB process where the 
LSCC, LSC, or JTSCC could lead a pre-award JCSB process (think 
first right of refusal for common contracted commodities and services), 
thus maximizing the efficiency and reducing the cost of contracts in 
support of a particular JOA.   
And in any case, observations, insights, and lessons from 
recent operations strongly indicate that TBC, while potentially a very 
useful tool, is difficult to implement and still requires additional 
refinement in the TBC processes and training of both the combatant 
command OCS staff and executing contracting organizations. Also, 
actual TBC implementation actions require additional contract 
oversight manpower that may not easily be acquired in the future with 
the expected reductions in various operational and contracting 
organization staffs across DoD. (C. Maurer, personal communication, 
June 26, 2013) 
Response from Rear Admiral Nicholas Kalathas:  
[TBC]: Theater business clearance was one forcing mechanism to herd 
all the cats and dogs that are out there.  It is not perfect, but it is good.  
[SPOT]: SPOT itself in concept makes a lot of sense.  We 
should be able to track everybody, know where everybody is.  Why 
not?  We knew where all of our soldiers and sailors and airmen and 
marines were, right?  We all have CAC [common access card] cards, 
right?  But we found that we weren’t able to do that very well and so 
SPOT has fixed a lot of those problems and in fact one of the positive 
things is that SOUTHCOM wants to implement SPOT at its 
headquarters in the United States for all of its contractors.  
[Integration cell]: There are opportunities and there are times 
when we should have unity of effort and I think that the best example 
was developed by General Casey Blake, my deputy in Afghanistan.  
He came up with a concept called integration cell that was pioneered in 
Regional Command East.  We saw that we were doing all these 
projects that were kind of lying on top of each other and his contracting 
officers were working 20 hours a day to satisfy all these requirements 
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in Afghanistan, ... and they were seeing requirements that we were 
doing over and over again, … which led to duplications, inefficiency.   
Finally he blew the whistle and he said, “Hey, wait a second.”  
He met with the [regional command] RC East commander and 
convinced him that there should be a board process.  Anybody who 
had a requirement, any colonel or any one star that had a requirement 
sat around a table with all your J codes and you looked at it and said, 
“All right, what do you got?  Why is this important?  Why do we have to 
do this?  What is the value?”  The important thing is that it forced the 
requirements community to sit around the table and say, “What are we 
doing here?  Are we walking on top of each other?  Are we building in 
efficiency?” (N. T. Kalathas, personal communication, June 27, 2013) 
Response from Victor Solero: 
[TBC, SPOT, and LOA]: Theater business clearance has to have more 
teeth. SPOT and the issuance of LOAs have got to have more teeth.  
Everybody has got their own contracting authority, and they basically 
say, “Well, I can write a contract and I don’t need your permission.”  
You’ve got to have some enforcement mechanism to say, “Okay, if you 
feel that way (I’m speaking for the commander because I’m the belly 
button) then I’m going to tell you, go home.”  Not only do I have to be 
able to mean it, I’ve got to be able to actually do something that 
enforces that.  Like the LOA, the letter of authorization that is given to 
contractors ... or something that says that I can deny you having a 
letter of authorization and not even allow you into the country.   
[Authority]: Those are the things that have to be worked 
through.  Coordinating authority is something that requires you to 
coordinate ... [but] doesn’t necessarily mean you have to follow.  But, 
for the most part, most people know that if you’re the guy who is 
speaking for the commander then unless you have a very, very good 
reason for not doing something, you’re going to follow along.  Having 
said that, in certain cases I think the JTSCC has the needed 
authorities, but they just don’t have any enforcement mechanism and I 
think that has hurt them.   
In some cases you have to force unity of effort ... because it’s 
not like contracting authority has just one chain so you almost have to 
force it.  You know, it’s one thing when you’re a commander.  You can 
force your subordinates to do whatever you want them to do.  They 
work for you and they belong to you.  Contract authority is different and 
that’s what makes it so difficult.  Until we change that, you basically 
have to force unity. (V. Solero, personal communication, June 26, 
2013) 
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Response from Colonel Mike Hoskin: 
[TBC]: Currently, the CENTCOM JTSCC commander controls theater 
business clearance in Afghanistan to manage what contracts and 
contractors are to work within Afghanistan.  TBC continues to be a 
critical tool to maintain unity of effort and unity of command.  The use 
of TBC is pretty mature in overseas operations.  We are still exploring 
how TBC would be used for a domestic disaster mission.   
[JCSB]: The Joint Contracting Support Board is established to 
manage requirements and the various contracting activities.  It is 
important for the COCOM to publish an order mandating the various 
contracting entities to be part of this board to minimize duplication of 
effort and mitigate problems associated with scarce resources. (M. 
Hoskin, personal communication, June 24, 2013) 
Response from Dan Matthews: 
[Drawdown cell and doctrine]: We are seeing C–JTSCC and the 
JCASO Drawdown Cell teaming to work contractor drawdown for U.S. 
forces Afghanistan.  There are two monthly meetings held to discuss 
progress, issues, and the way ahead.  One is an SVTC held with 
Army’s DASA (P) as the chair using the DoD authority for Army as the 
contracting executive agent in that nation.  The OCS and procurement 
communities come together to discuss and ensure unity of effort in 
drawdown.  Secondly, the same organizations hold a second meeting 
[at the (0-6/GS 15) action officer level] to work issues or get them in 
the open prior to the GO/SES SVTC.  They use the JCSB, a Joint 
Contracting Support Board from existing doctrine to do this.  So, 
bottom line, doctrine is taking hold and being used. (C. D. Matthews, 
personal communication, June 24, 2013)  
 SUBSIDARY QUESTION THREE  D.
During the course of the interviews, many interviewees discussed current 
measures taking place to help achieve better contracting unity of effort with respect 
to the DoD as a whole.  The intent of this question was to capture the latest and 
emerging DoD measures aimed at increasing effectiveness and efficiencies across 
the department. 
Subsidiary Question 3: Are there any discussions, initiatives, or 
measures currently in development to help achieve better contracting unity of 
effort for future similar operations?   
Response from Air Force Contracting Professional:   
[JP 4-10 Revision]: It’s a start.  I think we’re getting more fidelity to 
what OCS is and where we’re going.  No doubt about that.  Do I think 
we’re there?  No, because ultimately it’s going to take a cultural 
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change whereby all commanders/planners recognize OCS is just one 
of several means to accomplish their mission.  If a commander decides 
to utilize OCS, they must properly plan for it and manage it. 
[OCS mission integration]: As of right now, GCCs/JTFs may 
have ad hoc OCS integration cells that are essentially a pick-up game.  
The OCS Joint Concept identified the need for an OCS Mission 
Integration (OMI) cell at the GCC/JTF levels that is deliberately 
resourced with multi-functional members trained on OCS.  The OMI 
will focus on establishing structure and accountability for OCS 
requirements management and contractor support/oversight. (Air 
Force Contracting Professional, personal communication, June 27, 
2013) 
Response from William (Bill) Reich: 
[DCMA]: Early on with JCC–I/A, an MOA existed with DCMA ... where 
DCMA agreed up front that there were certain kinds of contracts that 
they would take on ... either theater-wide or high-risk contracts. Then 
upfront, when that TBC package came in, it was actually the 
[contracting officers] KOs who could propose the DCMA to take it on 
for administration and then DCMA would evaluate the package and 
figure out what it needed and then they would either accept it or not. 
In the updated JP 4-10, the intent is that DCMA in the future 
(with a future JTSCC) would not deploy as an independent command 
to perform contract administration; rather, future JTSCCs will have that 
... DCMA and services will provide IAs to man.  DCMA would provide 
the leadership and the reach back support associated with DCMA, but, 
again, the [JTSCC] commander basically would have cradle-to-grave 
responsibility for JTSCC contracts and then any other external 
contracts which it may make sense for JTSCC to take on. (W. Reich, 
personal communication, June 26, 2013)  
Response from Major General Camille Nichols: 
[JP 4-10]: You know doctrine—if nobody reads the doctrine, it doesn’t 
matter what the doctrine says.  The Army would augment where 
necessary and would start teaching it at every level at every school 
and more importantly, start exercising it.  But without the doctrine, you 
know the way our Army works, we aren’t going to get there. (C. 
Nichols, personal communication, July 8, 2013) 
Response from Brigadier General Joseph Bass: 
[Contract support teams]: The Expeditionary Contracting Command 
has a proposed Force Design Update that would create Contract 
Support Teams (CSTs) that would be aligned with the operational units 
such as Corps, Div, TSC/ESC and other type units to give them a team 
of contracting and OCS experts to support their OCS planning and 
execution.  Right now it’s a pickup game for most units to try and do 
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OCS during exercises and real-world deployments.  This CST concept 
would go a long way in synchronizing contracting and gaining unity of 
effort.  I’m not sure if the Army will support this under the current force 
structure constraints. (J. L. Bass, personal communication, June 24, 
2013) 
Response from Charles Maurer:  
[JOPEC and CON 334]: There are several main efforts to improve 
OCS and related contracting support actions in future operations. The 
first effort is the new Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course 
(JOPEC) currently being developed by the J-4 with significant Army 
assistance. This course, while focused mostly on combatant command 
and service component command OCS staff, also applies to selected 
members of operational focused contracting organizations such as 
USAF Expeditionary Contracting Squadrons and Army contracting 
support brigades. The JOPEC was successfully piloted in July and will 
be offered in numerous mobile training team actions over the next FY 
[fiscal year]. There also is an emerging initiative between DAU and the 
J-4 to revise the current Contracting (CON) 334 to include various new 
contracting support tasks such as how to run a JCSB, how to stand up 
a JTSCC, etc. This CON 334 enhancement effort will be directly tied to 
the JOPEC, but unlike the JOPEC, CON 334 will remain an acquisition 
officer-focused course vice a general OCS staff training course. (C. 
Maurer, personal communication, June 26, 2013) 
Response from Rear Admiral Nicholas Kalathas:  
[Drawdown cell]: [Based on lessons from Iraq], the operational contract 
support drawdown cell in Afghanistan is a big, big win for the OCS 
community because we never even used the term OCS when we were 
in Iraq.  Now, the OCS drawdown cell is paying attention to the 
contractors, we are paying attention to the property; all the issues that 
we were faced with in Iraq, we are now looking at methodically so 
there are no surprises.  The SPOT database now has a requirement 
that if you are a contractor and you are bringing stuff into country, it 
has to go into the SPOT.  You have to actually report how many 
CONEXs you are bringing in, the volume, etc. ... Whatever you are 
bringing in it has got to be reported in the SPOT database so that it just 
doesn’t disappear; it will stay there.   
[SPOT and TBC]: Now the PEOs are supposed to also be doing 
this, but I don’t know if we have gotten to the point where the PEOs are 
actually using SPOT to report.  
COCOMs have been watching CENTCOM, and how they have 
evolved, what they have done.  You know, not necessarily one size fits 
all and maybe some of it won’t apply now, but they are raising interest 
now that they are supposed to be planning for this.  So all those 
questions are being asked; should we have SPOT now?  Should we 
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have TBC now?  What do we have so that if we do get hit with 
something, we are ready?  What is important to start off with?  (N. T. 
Kalathas, personal communication, June 27, 2013) 
Response from Victor Solero: 
[OCS integration cell]: One of the things that they’re talking about is 
having an integration cell or center at each of the COCOMs that would 
be, in certain cases, a permanent organization, but it would only be 
three or four or five people ... and that could be the nucleus if 
something did happen of setting up a JTSCC or to assist a CSB or 
another contracting organization to do those kinds of things.  
[OCS vision for the 2020 force]: Basically, the charter is to forget 
about how things are done now.  How do you want it to be?  What is it 
that we want OCS to look like? (V. Solero, personal communication, 
June 26, 2013) 
Response from Colonel Mike Hoskin: 
[OCS joint concept]: There’s two big pieces with the joint concept.  One 
piece is called the OMI, which is an OCS integration cell that is at each 
geographic combatant command.  Then at each service component 
you also [have] LNOs or people who focus on OCS integration.  The 
way we have it built right now is that at least one person is a 
contracting professional.  In an OMI, there’s about five or six people; at 
least one contracting person, probably an engineer who’s smart in 
construction and a logistician ... people who are professional planners.  
Now, the other piece of the joint concept is the EA [executive 
agent].  EA is not a popular word in the Pentagon right now, and it 
stands for executive agent.  So, you can get away from the term, EA, 
but, really, I put it in three buckets.  One bucket is human capital or 
human resources management.  What agency or what organization is 
going to be responsible for managing the “1103,” or whatever the civil 
service equivalent is of an OCS planner (we don’t have one yet).  [For 
example], just like your field artillery branch, you have a proponency or 
you have a branch for field artillery that says that you need this many 
colonels, this many civil service, this many of this and that.  We need 
to have the same thing for OCS. 
Next you have a training piece.  The Air Force does a great job 
training them, and the Navy does a great job training them, and the 
Army does, but there’s no unity of effort there.  The AL&T–IO guys 
teach the 3 Charlie course and we (J4 OCSS) just wrote the next level 
of that, and it’s called JOPEC (Joint Operation Planning and Execution 
Course).  We call it the 4 Charlie course, and it’s to teach people to be 
planners.  Well, guess what?  We are not a schoolhouse, so we need a 
schoolhouse to be owner of the whole training piece.   
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The last piece of the EA to me is who is going to be the owner 
of all the toys, all the systems?  There are all these IT systems owned 
by all kinds of different people.  So, we are actively looking right now ... 
and talking with all the services and defense agencies, and asking, 
“Would a service or agency want to take on this whole responsibility or 
a piece of it?”  
[JOPEC]: The Joint OCS Planning & Execution Course is a 
higher level course that helps answer questions like, when do you 
make the decision to go LOGCAP or not?  When do you make the 
decision for lead service versus a JTSCC?  One thing that has helped 
us recently with this (JOPEC) class is that the last NDAA has 
mandated it.  So with that, instead of saying, “Hey, we’ve built all the 
task conditions and standards for all this training for you.” … “But 
guess what?  Congress has just told you, you will do this.” 
[Authorities working group]: The services got together a couple 
of months ago to look across the world and decide which service or 
multiple services would be the go-to senior business advisor in a time 
of emergency or conflict. For example, the Navy has said that they 
desire to be the senior business advisor for Africa; the Air Force has 
said that they desire to be the senior business advisor for PACOM and 
EUCOM.  This effort is still work in progress, and each COCOM has 
unique contracting command and control challenges.  (M. Hoskin, 
personal communication, June 24, 2013)  
Response from Dan Matthews: 
[OCS joint concept]: An OCS joint concept that’s striving to look to the 
future on how we’re going to support that force…while achieving unity 
of effort, achieving effective and efficient contracting, in support of an 
operation that’s designed for the future. There are pieces of it that are 
controversial, but don’t get hung up on that fact.  But we’re learning so 
fast, I think, that we’ve got to strike while the iron’s hot and write it back 
into the appropriate documentation guidance and instruction to get it 
out to the field so they can start working with it, get their hands on it, 
and actually do some of this and then come back to us. The ultimate 
end on this joint concept is it will be signed in the fall, but PACOM has 
already ponied up and said, “You guys want to experiment and want to 
run a pilot course on some of the pieces once you get the capabilities 
prioritized and gaps identified and all that stuff.”  They’ve offered 
themselves up as a candidate to do so.   
[OMI]: It’s not the same thing as the OSCIC (OSC Integration 
Cell). It’s an integration cell on steroids.  It’s tailored for that geographic 
combatant command. Besides a contracting person, engineer, and a 
logistician, I will tell you that there are a couple of others that you’ve 
always got to have that expertise on. Although not resident in the OCS 
Integration Cell or the OMI and one is a lawyer.  You’ve got to have the 
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legal guys.  You may not have a standing JAG sitting there in the thing, 
but the ability to run it through JAG.  The second one we’ve learned 
and taken right into the joint concept and we need to hit harder and 
harder and harder is the financial management.  The Army’s doctrine 
on financial management picks up on that.  That’s new doctrine coming 
out of the Army, 1-06, I think.  It’s called the fiscal triad-law, operation, 
dollars.  
[OCS exercise]: We’re working now on an exercise with 
NORTHCOM to see and identify the steps for setting up the JTSCC.  
We will validate [these steps], and see whether or not the need is there 
for that particular operation … based on the scope of it.  But that is a 
command and operational decision ... not a contracting and not an 
acquisition, if you will, only decision.  (C. D. Matthews, personal 
communication, June 24, 2013) 
Response from Anna Carter, Director, Operational Contract Support 
Plans & Programs, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Program Support): 
[Functional Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB)]: It grew out of the 
need for a single DoD senior executive forum to address increased 
congressional interest in OCS, emerging and evolving doctrine and 
policy issues. Specific issues from the Commission on Wartime 
Contracting and concerns over use of private security contractors 
(PSCs) also accelerated the effort to establish this forum. Today, this 
joint forum continues to oversee, guide, and direct collaborative efforts 
of multiple stakeholders working to institutionalize OCS across DoD.  
Our role in OSD, is to encourage collaboration and make sure there is 
cooperation across the department, and we’ve done a lot better with 
this than in the past. (A. Carter, personal communication, June 24, 
2013) 
Response from Brigadier General Theodore Harrison: 
[OCS joint concept]: I don’t know exactly where that is [in 
development], but it is getting worked with the Joint Staff J4. 
[Force structure]: AL&T–IO is helping us take a look at our force 
structure.  Again, as we go through this total Army analysis (TAA) over 
the next several years, especially as the Army downsizes, we are not 
even sure we have got our structure right. That makes us very 
vulnerable when the Army is taking cuts, especially if we are being 
asked to take more cuts than the overall percentage share of the 
Army’s force structure.  So we are working as quickly as we can. … 
For instance, if the four-man teams are the right structure, could it be 
different, who should we align with, who are our workload drivers.   
[Center of Excellence]: When we stood up our force structure, 
we really didn’t build a Center of Excellence like other warfighting 
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capabilities have.  Many people I talk with say, “Yes, I know.  
Contracting has really become a warfighting capability.”  I mean we 
have got to have it in a war.  But you know the logistic guys have 
[combined arms support command] CASCOM, the maneuver guys 
have Fort Benning, and the fire support guys have got Fort Sill.  They 
developed doctrine, they work force structure, they make sure that 
training is well constructed, and they have got a good framework for 
officers, enlisted professional development, and education.  Well, we 
are on our own because we don’t have that school that integrates all 
this. It is done by a bunch of disparate folks at the Acquisition 
Sustainment Center, Acquisition Management Branch, and AL&T–IO.  
They are helping a little bit.  ECC is certainly doing a lot of heavy lifting, 
but it is hard to synchronize these like a schoolhouse would do.  
The thing that I try to point out, during the total Army analysis, 
as we are reducing force structure in combat service support units and 
combat support units, what is the Army going to do to mitigate those 
structure losses?  Well, one of the things that they said is, well, we will 
contract for it.  Well, what are you doing to create the capability to 
contract for it?  Are you deep enough in your contracting as you 
simultaneously downsize units?  (T. C. Harrison, personal 
communication, August 20, 2013) 
 SUBSIDARY QUESTION FOUR  E.
Many interviewees provided their thoughts on the doctrinal way ahead for 
OCS. The intent of this question was to identify gaps in doctrine that should be 
addressed in order to provide official guidance for commanders who use OCS.  
Responses from interviewees who have already covered this aspect of unity of effort 
in other question areas are not included. 
Subsidiary Question 4: In order to prevent the same lessons learned, are 
there any OCS doctrinal changes that need to be made to ensure we have better 
contracting unity of effort?   
Response from Air Force Contracting Professional:   
[Total force]: Treat contractors as part of the total force.  They’re part of 
the total force and they enable us to accomplish our mission.  We have 
to integrate OCS into our established processes, structures, training, 
systems, etc., and avoid creating something separate to manage OCS.  
For example, we created a separate system, the Synchronized Pre-
deployment Operational Tracker (SPOT) and process for tracking and 
accounting for Contractors Authorized to Accompany the Force 
(CAAF).  In my opinion, we should have modified our reception 
process and systems to account for CAAF in a similar manner as we 
do for military and civilians.  If we establish separate OCS processes, 
structures, training, systems, etc., it’s very difficult to hold the normal 
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command chain accountable and ultimately drive the culture change 
that needs to occur.   
[OCS is multifunctional]: If there’s one thing you can take away 
from this is a lot of people will try to say “OCS” and then want to know 
“who’s responsible.”  It’s a multifunctional process that involves all 
functional areas/joint codes.  You’ve got to at least break OCS into its 
process elements and have accountability for the inputs 
(requirements), processing (contracting), and outputs (contractors). 
(Air Force Contracting Professional, personal communication, June 27, 
2013) 
Response from William (Bill) Reich: 
[TBC]: In 2007–2008, we were aware of TBC, ... but it was not far 
enough advanced for us to put it into doctrine.  Part of the problem is, 
like I said, the theater business clearance requirement originated in the 
DPAP letters and PGI.  There was never really anything issued to 
combatant commanders to tell them, “Hey, this tool is available for 
you.”  You know, of course, that’s the intent with the updated joint 
doctrine.  (W. Reich, personal communication, June 26, 2013) 
Response from Major General Camille Nichols: 
[Contractor accountability]: At the strategic level, with a four-star in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, they wanted to know how many contractors were on 
the ground and, of course, I said, “Why are you asking me?  If it’s a 
personnel issue, we should go ask the J1.”  So, you try to put all the 
pressure on the KO when you really need the people who own the 
terrain to be responsible for the terrain.  You need the people who had 
the requirement for purchasing, because it’s their requirement, it’s their 
need, it’s their contract, and it’s their success of their mission that’s 
counting on the service that’s being provided. 
That change in perspective is dramatic, and in 13 years in 
combat contracting it’s not going to change, and that’s why it’s got to 
be in the new doctrine. You can’t make that KO be responsible for the 
literal execution of bedding [arrangements] for contractors A, B or C, 
especially in combat.   
Someone needs to understand where all contractors are, what 
they’re doing, how much money is being spent, and what they’re doing 
to local economies.  All that analysis is essential for the mission 
commander, the tactical mission commander, and we weren’t able to 
do hardly any of that for him.  The new doctrine gives me some say in 
that role and a little bit more control.  I don’t think it goes far enough 
though. (C. Nichols, personal communication, July 8, 2013) 
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Response from Brigadier General Joseph Bass: 
[Lessons learned]: I think that the AL&T–IO folks are doing a 
tremendous job in identifying, capturing, and addressing many of the 
OCS doctrinal issues.  They are working a number of rewrites of 
current regs [regulations] and putting together a new reg to address 
OCS issues.  The key is getting all of the lessons learned into these 
regs so that the issues and actions are institutionalized and codified so 
that the next generation of OCS folks (contracting, logistics, 
warfighters, whoever) understand the issues and actions that need to 
be addressed before, during, and after any exercise or deployment.  
That’s been the problem from my perspective; … we have to continue 
relearning these important lessons.  I have copies of AARs dated in 
1991 from contracting officers who served in Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm with the 18th ABC who identified the exact same issues that I 
dealt with in OIF in the 2007 timeframe … It’s clear to me that we didn’t 
learn or document the lessons. (J. L. Bass, personal communication, 
June 24, 2013)  
Response from Charles Maurer:  
[Lessons learned and Way Ahead for Doctrine]: While there is no 
formal joint operational contract support lessons learned program, the 
J-4, the Army AL&T–IO office, [Defense Logistics Agency’s] DLA’s 
Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office, and various OSD(AT&L) 
staff work together to share OCS-related observations, insights, and 
lessons emerging from current operations around the globe. The 
results of this informal joint OCS lessons learned effort are being 
incorporated into the revised JP 4-10 along with numerous other JPs 
and Service doctrinal publications. The most significant changes to 
current OCS doctrine are the clarification of the following three OCS 
mission-focused areas: (1) contract support planning and integration, 
(2) contracting planning and coordination, and (3) contractor 
management. Major related initiatives being codified in some detail in 
JP 4-10 include the idea of a joint force command OCS integration cell 
as already seen in most geographic combatant commands and in 
[United States Forces–Afghanistan] USFOR–A today, along with the 
contracting support-related LSCC, LSC, and JTSCC constructs. The 
revised JP 4-10 also includes clarified and more detailed text related to 
OCS boards such as the joint requirements review board (currently 
referred to as the joint acquisition review board or JARB) and JCSB. 
Again, this revised doctrine is the basis for the emerging JOPEC and 
will be the basis for the revised CON 334.  (C. Maurer, personal 
communication, June 26, 2013) 
Response from Rear Admiral Nicholas Kalathas:  
[Drawdown operations]: Number one, there was no guideline in 
doctrine.  So the JP 4-10, which talks about OCS and contingency 
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contracting, has nothing in there about how to get out of a conflict.  It 
has got everything from Phase 0 and 1 and 2 and you get to 
sustainment, but as far as leaving, it doesn’t have anything in there.  
Ever since the Gansler Commission came out in 2007 and said 
we needed to have general officers in command in these situations 
because we are exposed to having contractors on the battlefield, we 
are doing things now in a very different way than we used to do them.    
[Lessons learned analysis]: If we were to look at all the lessons 
learned and say, what did we do right?  What did we do wrong?  What 
should you avoid for the next contingency?  So when you go about 
your exercises and you build up your annex Ws, your annexes for your 
CONOPS and your O Plans, you are prepared to avoid those pitfalls 
and you are able to capitalize on the good things that you have done in 
the past.  We have never seen that.  We have never looked at that.  
[Phase 0 planning]: If you look at just contracting alone, just the 
contracting piece, I am willing to bet that no matter what the 
contingency, we are probably buying bottled water, we are probably 
buying some comfort items, generators, port-a-potties, etc.  If we know 
that is going to be the case, we could be putting that stuff on long-term 
contracts ahead of time so there is not as much contracting needed.  A 
lot what we were buying could have been bought back in the states on 
large delivery order-type contracts that are already pre-negotiated and 
pre-existent.  But when you are in the fight you don’t have a lot of time 
to do that. (N. T. Kalathas, personal communication, June 27, 2013) 
Response from Victor Solero: 
[OCS integration cell]: That’s not mentioned in the old doctrine, but it’s 
supposed to be in the one that’s coming out about an 
integration/coordination cell. (V. Solero, personal communication, June 
26, 2013) 
Response from Major General Harold Greene:  
[Authority]: Okay, so now what’s our solution to field our contractors?  
It’s commander’s business, … not the C–JTSCC’s business.  It’s that 
commander and his staff.  Now, if he says, “C–JTSCC, you’re my 
special staff officer responsible for tracking this and here’s the 
OPORD, and it has all of the staff and subordinate elements on how 
you will support that guy in executing that mission”—[then its C–
JTSCC].  [This should be] based on doctrine, polices or written orders. 
[CORs and structure]: So if I go out and I’m at a command 
headquarters and there’s an organizational structure, right?  And you 
can track that and you know when everything goes down, right?  Okay, 
so you’ve got a PCO and an ACO and a COR, where’s the doctrine on 
CORs in theater?  The people who can actually—are in that chain 
directly, what’s the relationship between the CORs on these contracts 
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and these requiring activities and whoever the commander’s staff 
officer, who’s responsible for contracting?  One of the things we did is 
we said, “Okay, PEOs, [if] you’re going to have presence forward, have 
a COR for them.”  So what’s the organizational structure for CORs?  
It’s to give you the ability to impact and track and actually give proper 
legal guidance to those people on the ground. (H. J. Greene, personal 
communication, July 11, 2013) 
Response from Colonel Mike Hoskin: 
[Command and control]: Clearly identify who’s in charge.  In many 
cases DoD will not be in charge of the mission.  For example, if it’s an 
HA/DR mission outside of CONUS, the State Department and USAID 
are in charge and we are a supporting force.  If it is a war fight, the 
DoD is in charge.  If it is CONUS-based HA/DR mission, the governor 
of the state that’s impacted and FEMA [Federal Emergency 
Management Agency], would be in charge, and we’ll be a supporting 
effort to that.  It is important the command and control be clearly 
articulated and defined in operations and contingency plans   
I just want to give you this one other quick little analogy to show 
you how far we have come in the last few years.  During JCC–I/A, it 
probably took six months to actually establish the authorities and the 
orders and, you know, getting services to play nice.  The afternoon that 
Hurricane Sandy was making its way toward NY and NJ, NORTHCOM 
called the Joint Staff requesting increased acquisition dollar thresholds 
for the pending natural disaster.  The Joint Staff agreed with 
NORTHCOM and worked with OSD to issue the needed guidance.  
OSD quickly acted upon the request and provided NORTHCOM with 
the authorities needed within one day.  The quick actions by 
NORTHCOM, OSD, and the JS ensured that DoD contracting 
organizations responding to Hurricane Sandy had the flexibilities 
needed. (M. Hoskin, personal communication, June 24, 2013) 
Response from Dan Matthews: 
[Doctrine and planning]: You’ve got to remember that this doctrine is 
less than five years old, and we’re already changing it and making 
some fairly significant changes in it.    
In that doctrine, we start to attack across the spectrum of 
operations.  Frankly, in 2008, JP 4-10 was written kind of focused on 
planning phases 3, 4, and 5, and it’s good there.  There are a lot of 
good roots there.  Now we are backed up and now we’re looking at 
theater campaign plans, we’re looking at shaping operations and pure 
peace time and what’s the impact of OCS there, and we’re still learning 
a lot.  We’re still, if you will, kind of guiding each other by the hand for 
what we can do in shaping operations where there’s potentially one 
contractor, one uniform, and one bag man.  There’s a whole world out 
there that I think needs to be explored. 
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[OCS cell]: In the new JP 4-10, you’ll see us talk about an OCS 
integration cell.  We’re seeing, even without the doctrine being out 
there, we’re seeing some of the field armies establishing an 
operational contract support integration cell.  U.S. Army Africa has an 
established one with a four-man cell; U.S. Forces, Korea is talking 
about establishing an operational contract support integration cell, not 
only at the JTF level, but also down at the field Army level.  (C. D. 
Matthews, personal communication, June 24, 2013) 
Response from Brigadier General Theodore Harrison: 
[Deployable ECC]: One of the capabilities that DoD probably needs to 
have is a deployable expeditionary contracting capability.  As an 
example, Expeditionary Contracting Command [ECC] was designed to 
be able to deploy as a headquarters and be a deployed HCA in 
theater, but you really won’t find that in doctrine anywhere, either Army 
doctrine or joint doctrine. 
[Army Techniques Publication 4-92]: We are also redoing ATP 
4-92.  ATP 4-92 is another piece of doctrine that we are trying to get 
right.  We never, when we set up the ECC, we never really aligned well 
enough in terms of where our key mission demand drivers were.  We 
basically said one [contingency contracting team] CCT per [brigade 
combat team] BCT, two for a sustainment brigade and that was about 
it. I think what you are going to see, is it is going to be a more holistic 
expeditionary contracting document that is going to cover ECC, the 
brigade, the battalion, and the team. (T. C. Harrison, personal 
communication, August 20, 2013) 
 CONCLUSION F.
This chapter presents our data collected from our in-depth interviews with 
senior DoD leaders.  Our interviews were transcribed by the NPS Acquisition 
Research Program and sorted according to their corresponding research questions.  
These data, along with our literature review, provide us the information to conduct an 
analysis using the DOTMLPF–P framework in our next chapter. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 INTRODUCTION A.
Using the literature review as a knowledge base for our topic, we first 
examined interview data to identify common themes for our research questions. We 
next analyzed our data using the DOTMLPF–P framework (see Figure 11) to provide 
easily understood solutions and approaches for our respondents’ answers. In this 
chapter, we provide the common themes for each question and organize them within 
the DOTMLP–F framework. 
 
Figure 11. DOTMLPF–P Framework Matrix 
 COMMON THEME ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS B.
Upon completion of our interviews, we identified common themes for each 
respective research question.  Using a simple spreadsheet to capture each 
respondent’s answers, we were able to visualize which answers most often 
appeared (see Figure 12).   
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Figure 12. DOTMLPF–P Framework Matrix 
For each question, we calculated the number of times our pool of 
respondents were adamant about a particular theme.  Themes were scored based 
on the number of times they were mentioned.  Next, we calculated the overall 
highest scores for the entire data set.  High scores for each question are highlighted 
green and overall high scores are highlighted blue.  Using the DOTMLPF–P 
framework, we organized each theme into its corresponding category for ease of 
identification.  Each of the following headings corresponds to one of our specific 
research questions and the corresponding common themes to those questions.  
Individual interviewee responses are in no particular order 
Primary Question 1: How can we achieve better contracting unity of 
effort in the CENTCOM AOR? 
Overwhelmingly, respondents felt strongly about clearly establishing 
contracting command and control from the start to achieve better CUE.  Due to the 
complex nature of procurement authority in the CENTCOM AOR (disparate 
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contracting agencies and authorities), establishing clear lines of contracting C2 is a 
necessary first step in all contingency contracting operations. The specific C2 
organization should be based on size, scope, expected duration, available vendor 
base, and various other mission factors. 
I believe we should be focused on achieving overall unity of effort for 
the operation and not necessarily on achieving contracting unity of 
effort. If I’m trying to achieve better contracting unity of effort, the best 
way to do this is to have command and control (C2) of all contracting 
within a JOA.  This allows for the integration of all service/agency 
contracting authority under a single Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) 
and command structure.  However, doing this means you create two 
separate C2 structures for executing BOS, and base/installation 
commanders no longer have C2 of a critical enabling capability 
(contracting) needed to accomplish their assigned missions.  
This does not mean that achieving better contracting unity of 
effort and overall unity of effort for the operation will never parallel each 
other.  In operations where economic lines of operation are most 
critical to mission accomplishment, achieving unity of contracting effort 
by having a separate contracting C2 structure may be consistent with 
achieving overall unity of effort for the operation.  In operations where 
military lines of operation are most critical to mission accomplishment, 
achieving unity of contracting effort by having a separate contracting 
C2 structure can actually be counter-productive to achieving overall 
unity of effort for the operation.   
Therefore, the focus should always be on achieving overall unity 
of effort for the operation and not necessarily contracting unity of effort.  
How we organize within CENTCOM or any GCC really depends on the 
operation and whether the economic lines of operation or military lines 
of operation are most critical to mission accomplishment. (Air Force 
Contracting Professional, personal communication, June 27, 2013)   
A commander, at certain phases of operation should be given 
certain levels of authority …. whichever service is the lead for 
contracting must be able to direct everyone in DoD to do certain things 
in support of a senior mission functional contracting commander, 
whatever service it is. (C. Nichols, personal communication, July 8, 
2013)  
In a perfect world, your solution would be there if there was only 
one contracting agency in theater. So, how do you solve it?  You find 
all the things that prevent that from existing.  To me, that is the 
disparate authorities to have people in theater doing contracting.  You 
can easily solve that with policy.  You really want to have it 
institutionalized.  To me, that’s doctrine. (C. A. Spisak, personal 
communication, May 9, 2013) 
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I think it seems logical to me. If you want unity of effort, you 
have the procurement authority flow through the combatant 
commander and then he’s responsible for the procurements in his 
AOR.  If somebody else comes in the AOR, at least he can hold them 
accountable because he’s the commander.  You can’t have the 
contracting commander trying to hold somebody accountable that’s not 
under their command.  We have to go back to the combatant 
commander and try to get them to help us, and that’s why it’s hard to 
get that unity of effort. (J. L. Bass, personal communication, June 24, 
2013) 
It’s a command responsibility and you can’t fix a command 
problem with a staff organization unless the command who owns it is 
putting out the policy and there is a doctrine that underpins it that 
makes it all work. (H. J. Greene, personal communication, July 11, 
2013) 
During Operation Tomodachi … I quickly assessed the situation 
and decided that command and control of contracting should be 
quickly established because we both expected the United States to 
quickly flow forces to Japan to assist in this natural disaster. (M. 
Hoskin, personal communication, June 24, 2013) 
Subsidiary Question 2: What steps has C-JTSCC taken to synchronize 
current contracting activities efforts and to what extent are they effective?   
The preponderance of responses for question two concerned improving the 
use of TBC, SPOT, and LOAs and ensuring they are updated in new OCS doctrine.  
Many interviewees thought having these tools in place aided CUE but indicated a 
need for them to be expanded and enforced. 
Some of the biggest challenges we previously faced with OCS are (1) 
we often lacked visibility and accountability for contractors, (2) we 
failed to coordinate with BOS providers at the installation/base level to 
ensure there is adequate government-furnished life support (GFLS) 
available for the contractors, and (3) external and systems support 
contracts lacked the appropriate JOA clauses implementing GCC/JTF 
policies.  Many times contracting is accomplished by a service/agency 
contracting activity outside the AOR, and contractors would just show 
up in the AOR without any coordination with the base/installation 
responsible for providing their life support. 
Therefore, C–JTSCC implemented the theater business 
clearance (TBC) process for external and systems support contracts.  
This process ensures that C–JTSCC reviews solicitations and 
contracts to ensure they include the appropriate local clauses 
implementing GCC/JTF policies.  The TBC process was recently 
amended to ensure there is communication/coordination with BOS 
providers to ensure adequate GFLS is available when contractors 
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show up.  C–JTSCC is also accomplishing TBC through the Joint 
Contingency Contract System (JCCS) module, and if TBC is not 
accomplished, contractors are unable to get letters of authorization 
(LOAs) issued via the Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational 
Tracker (SPOT).  Since the LOA is what authorizes a contractor to 
receive GFLS, such as MWR, food, billeting, etc., it helps with 
enforcing the TBC requirement. (Air Force Contracting Professional, 
personal communication, June 27, 2013) 
Theater business clearance and SPOT are used to align 
procurement trackers to help codify who had clearance or who didn’t.  
What we did though was we really took some dramatic steps to not 
allow people in and to remove people who didn’t have a validated letter 
of authorization (LOA), as it related to their contract. (C. Nichols, 
personal communication, July 8, 2013) 
Theater business clearance is a policy from CENTCOM that 
says you will not do a contract here without us first approving it.  That 
was their attempt to try to get unity of effort.  But what if you’re not in 
DoD?  TBC is okay … but what if you don’t comply?  What happens?  I 
mean, there really are no teeth to it to make people do it. (J. L. Bass, 
personal communication, June 24, 2013) 
TBC in the optimum world would include much more than the 
deployment clause and GFS synchronization; it would include a pre-
award JCSB process where the LSCC, LSC, or JTSCC could lead a 
pre-award JCSB process (think first right of refusal for common 
contracted commodities and services), thus maximizing the efficiency 
and reducing the cost of contracts in support of a particular JOA.  And 
in any case, observations, insights, and lessons from recent operations 
strongly indicate that TBC, while potentially a very useful tool, is 
difficult to implement and still requires additional refinement in the TBC 
processes and training of both the combatant command OCS staff and 
executing contracting organizations. (C. Maurer, personal 
communication, June 26, 2013) 
Theater business clearance was one forcing mechanism to herd 
all the cats and dogs that are out there.  It is not perfect, but it is good.  
SPOT itself in concept makes a lot of sense.  We should be able to 
track everybody, know where everybody is.  Why not?  We knew 
where all of our soldiers and sailors and airmen and marines were, 
right? (N. T. Kalathas, personal communication, June 27, 2013) 
Theater business clearance has to have more teeth. SPOT and 
the issuance of LOAs have got to have more teeth.  Everybody has got 
their own contracting authority, and they basically say, “Well, I can 
write a contract and I don’t need your permission.”  You’ve got to have 
some enforcement mechanism to say … “Not only do I have to be able 
to mean it, I’ve got to be able to actually do something that enforces 
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that.”  Like the LOA, the letter of authorization that is given to 
contractors ... or something that says that I can deny you having a 
Letter of Authorization and not even allow you into the country.  (V. 
Solero, personal communication, June 26, 2013) 
Currently, the CENTCOM JTSCC commander controls theater 
business clearance in Afghanistan to manage what contracts and 
contractors are to work within Afghanistan.  TBC continues to be a 
critical tool to maintain unity of effort and unity of command.  The use 
of TBC is pretty mature in overseas operations.  We are still exploring 
how TBC would be used for a domestic disaster mission.  (M. Hoskin, 
personal communication, June 24, 2013) 
Subsidiary Question 3: Are there any discussions, initiatives, or 
measures currently in development to help achieve better contracting unity of 
effort for future similar operations?   
The majority of interviewees indicated the need to create or improve existing 
organizations to enhance OCS synchronization at the COCOM and service levels of 
command.  Many identified the need for a variety of OCS organizational changes 
and measures designed to enhance CUE going forward.  Organizational 
enhancements mentioned included OCS integration cells, drawdown cells, 
contracting support teams, a center of excellence, and a deployable Expeditionary 
Contracting Command. 
The Expeditionary Contracting Command has a proposed Force 
Design Update that would create Contract Support Teams (CSTs) that 
would be aligned with the operational units such as Corps, Div., 
TSC/ESC and other type units to give them a team of Contracting and 
OCS experts to support their OCS planning and execution.  Right now, 
it’s a pickup game for most units to try and do OCS during exercises 
and real-world deployments.  This CST concept would go a long way in 
synchronizing contracting and gaining unity of effort.  I’m not sure if the 
Army will support this under the current force structure constraints. (J. 
L. Bass, personal communication, June 24, 2013) 
[Based on lessons from Iraq,] the operational contract support 
drawdown cell in Afghanistan is a big, big win for the OCS community 
because we never even used the term OCS when we were in Iraq.  
Now, the OCS drawdown cell is paying attention to the contractors, we 
are paying attention to the property, all the issues that we were faced 
with in Iraq we are now looking at methodically so there are no 
surprises.  (N. T. Kalathas, personal communication, June 27, 2013) 
One of the things that they’re talking about is having an 
integration cell or center at each of the COCOMs that would be, in 
certain cases, a permanent organization, but it would only be three or 
four or five people, ... and that could be the nucleus if something did 
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happen of setting up a JTSCC or to assist a CSB or another 
contracting organization to do those kinds of things. (V. Solero, 
personal communication, June 26, 2013)  
[OCS joint concept]: There are two big pieces with the Joint 
Concept.  One piece is called the OMI [OCS mission integrator], which 
is an OCS integration cell that is at each geographic combatant 
command. Then at each service component you also [have] LNOs or 
people who focus on OCS integration.  The way we have it built right 
now is that at least one person is a contracting professional.  In an 
OMI, there’s about five or six people; at least one contracting person, 
probably an engineer who’s smart in construction and a logistician ... 
people who are professional planners. (M. Hoskin, personal 
communication, June 24, 2013) 
[OCS mission integrator (OMI)]: It’s not the same thing as the 
OSCIC (OSC Integration Cell). It’s an integration cell on steroids.  It’s 
tailored for that geographic combatant command. Besides a 
contracting person, engineer, and a logistician, I will tell you that there 
are a couple of others that you’ve always got to have that expertise on, 
... one is lawyers. …  The second one …is the financial management. 
(C. D. Matthews, personal communication, June 24, 2013) 
[Functional Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB)]: It grew out of 
the need for a single DoD senior executive forum to address increased 
congressional interest, in OCS, emerging and evolving doctrine and 
policy issues. Our role in OSD is to encourage collaboration and make 
sure there is cooperation across the department, and we’ve done a lot 
better with this than in the past. (A. Carter, personal communication, 
June 24, 2013) 
When we stood up our force structure, we really didn’t build a 
Center of Excellence like other war fighting capabilities have. It is done 
by a bunch of disparate folks at the Acquisition Sustainment Center, 
Acquisition Management Branch, and AL&T–IO.  They are helping a 
little bit.  ECC is certainly doing a lot of heavy lifting, but it is hard to 
synchronize these like a schoolhouse would do. (T. C. Harrison, 
personal communication, August 20, 2013)  
Subsidiary Question 4: In order to prevent the same lessons learned, 
are there any OCS doctrinal changes that need to be made to ensure we have 
better contracting unity of effort? 
The main answer for this question related to the overall concept of change.  
Interviewees identified the need to improve and change the way the DoD manages, 
integrates and plans for OCS. Planning for OCS needs to be seen as multifunctional 
and not just a logistical or contracting function.  Several respondents indicated this 
entire process, to include better OCS planning and management, as a cultural 
change or an institutionalization of OCS.  
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If there’s one thing you can take away from this is a lot of people will 
try to say “OCS” and then want to know “who’s responsible.”  It’s a 
multifunctional process that involves all functional areas/joint codes.  
You’ve got to at least break OCS into its process elements and have 
accountability for the inputs (requirements), processing (contracting), 
and outputs (contractors). (Air Force Contracting Professional, 
personal communication, June 27, 2013) 
[Contractor accountability]: If it’s a personnel issue, we should 
go ask the J1.  So, you try to put all the pressure on the KO when you 
really need the people who own the terrain to be responsible for the 
terrain.  That change in perspective is dramatic and in 13 years in 
combat contracting it’s not going to change, and that’s why it’s got to 
be in the new doctrine. You can’t make that KO be responsible for the 
literal execution of bedding [arrangements] for contractors A, B, or C, 
especially in combat. … The new doctrine gives me some say in that 
role and a little bit more control.  I don’t think it goes far enough 
though. (C. Nichols, personal communication, July 8, 2013) 
A lot of it starts with planning.  Eighteen months ago the GAO 
reported that there were only two annex Ws in existence. During the 
last 18 months we have focused on this challenge and currently have 
about 50% of the problem solved. Increasing unity of effort and unity of 
command starts with the actual plans.  The plan should stipulate that 
when a particular event or trigger happens, we will go to lead service 
for contracting or to a JTSCC. (M. Hoskin, personal communication, 
June 24, 2013) 
Let’s go back to Gansler (Report) in 2007.  It specifically 
earmarked the Army and said, “There’s an institutional side of the 
Army, if you will,” … “and an operational side of the Army, and we 
need to make sure we integrate those efforts.”  I’m not sure we’re there 
yet in the Army.  We’re better than we were in 2007, but it’s not just the 
JTSCC.  I think it’s an overall DoD capability or mentality about the 
capability itself and the understanding of it. (C. D. Matthews, personal 
communication, June 24, 2013) 
If you look at just contracting alone, just the contracting piece, I 
am willing to bet that no matter what the contingency, we are probably 
buying bottled water, we are probably buying some comfort items, 
generators, port-a-potties, etc.  A lot that we were buying could have 
been bought back in the states on large delivery order-type contracts 
that are already pre-negotiated and pre-existent.  But when you are in 
the fight you don’t have a lot of time to do that. (N. T. Kalathas, 
personal communication, June 27, 2013) 
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 DOTMLPF–P ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS C.
During the analysis, we placed each common theme in doctrine, organization, 
training, materiel, leadership and education, and policy categories.  Facilities and 
personnel categories were considered but were not identified by our interviewees 
during our research.   
1. Doctrine and Policy 
The majority of answers fell within the categories of doctrine and policy.  As 
mentioned before, OCS doctrine and policy were nearly absent prior to DoDI 
3020.41 (DoD, 2005) in 2005 and JP 4-10 (CJCS, 2008) in 2008.  Doctrine is the set 
of “principles that guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated action 
toward a common objective” (CJCS, 2012b, p. A4).  Military leaders use doctrine to 
apply military power in conjunction with policy and strategy.  Policy refers to those 
documents that impact one of the other DOTMLPF components.  The following 
common themes can be addressed using doctrine and policy approaches: 
1. Ensure new OCS doctrine incorporates the latest lessons learned so 
there is an overall improvement of current OCS doctrine.  
2. Ensure doctrine is updated to reflect the TBC, SPOT, and LOA 
process. 
3. Ensure doctrine and policy address the need to establish clear 
command and control of the contracting mission for any given 
operation. 
4. Ensure that policies improve the use of contracting boards (JARB, 
JCSB, etc.), TBC, and SPOT, especially with non-DoD organizations 
and system/external support contracts. 
2. Organization 
The majority of respondents provided organization solutions for question 
three.  Organization refers to the structure through which personnel collaborate to 
work towards common objectives.  “This includes the joint staffing (military, civilian, 
and contractor support) required to plan, operate, sustain, and reconstitute … 
capabilities” (CJCS, 2012b, p. A5).  The following common themes can be 
addressed using organizational approaches: 
1. Create an OCS integration cell/mission integrator for each geographic 
combatant command. JCASO currently has two OCS planners at each 
COCOM.  Additionally, create a similar organization for each service. 
2. Establish an OCS center of excellence. 
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3. Create contract support teams (CSTs) that would be aligned with the 
operational units such as corps and divisions.  This team of contracting 
and OCS experts would support OCS planning and execution. 
4. Create an OCS drawdown cell for the final phases of an operation. 
3. Training, Leadership, and Education 
Several respondents were adamant about training, leadership, and education 
solutions to achieve better CUE.  Training refers to an individual’s or unit’s training of 
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.  Leadership and education refer to the 
professional development of leaders to “produce the most professionally competent 
individuals possible” (CJCS, 2012b, p. A5).  The following common themes can be 
addressed using training, leadership, and educational approaches: 
1. Improve OCS training for non-acquisition personnel to enhance 
planning for OCS. 
2. Improve integration of OCS into ongoing exercises, military 
professional development, and leadership courses. 
3. Provide greater focus on improvements in OCS training and integration 
in order to bring about institutional change. 
4. Materiel 
Many interviewees mentioned the need to improve our current process for 
capturing lessons learned.  A materiel solution could be identified to capture OCS 
lessons learned for incorporation into doctrine and other related publications.  
Materiel are those items required to operate, equip, and support military activities 
(CJCS, 2012b).  The following common themes can be addressed using materiel 
approaches: 
1. Provide a way to capture OCS lessons learned into the various 
doctrine publications. 
2. Create a formal joint OCS lessons learned program. 
 CONCLUSION D.
This chapter presented our analysis and findings for the data we collected 
during our in-depth interviews with senior DoD leaders.  We conducted an analysis 
of the responses to our questions, found common themes, and then placed them in 
the correct DOTMLPF–P category.  In our next chapter, we present our final 
recommendations and final summary. 
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The focus of this chapter is to provide our final recommendations.  In this 
research, we sought to examine key documents and capture the strategic thinking of 
senior DoD leaders regarding OCS and CUE.  We provided the purpose, research 
questions, a literature review, selected interview data, and the final results of our 
analysis and findings.  This final chapter first presents a summary of our research 
and then identifies our final recommendations.  Last, we provide areas for further 
research.      
 SUMMARY B.
As contracting operations continued to change at a rapid pace over the last 
13 years, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted the enormous changes for 
conducting OCS.  The increased need for contract support during OIF and OEF 
showcased the DoD’s reliance on contract support.  The DoD’s increased need for 
contract support and inadequate preparations to execute OCS led to an overall lack 
of contracting unity of effort. 
The purpose of this research was to investigate how to better achieve 
contracting unity of effort in the U.S. Central Command area of operations and the 
implications for other combatant commands in similar contingency situations.  In the 
U.S. Central Command area of operations, numerous contracting agencies operate 
in Afghanistan each with its own contract authority, but these agencies have very 
little synchronization and no common operating picture.  These numerous 
contracting organizations include CJTSCC, DCMA, LOGCAP, USAID, USACE, 
Special Operation Command, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Army 
and Air Force Exchange Service, U.S. Army Medical Command, and various non-
governmental organizations, which make contracting unity of effort difficult to 
maximize.  In contrast the overarching operational command authority lies with one 
single organization, U.S. Central Command.  Having this unified command authority 
in place allows U.S. Central Command to work towards common objects and to 
achieve unity of effort.   
To conduct thorough research on our selected topic, we completed a careful 
examination of existing literature and conducted several in-depth interviews with 
senior DoD leaders.  After identifying the common themes for our research 
questions we completed an analysis of selected interview data using the DOTMLPF-
P framework to arrive at our final recommendations. 
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 RECOMMENDATIONS C.
During the course of our interviews, we specifically asked each interviewee 
how to better achieve contracting unity of effort in the CENTCOM AOR.  Although 
the focus of our investigation was achieving better CUE, our respondents indicated 
the need to address the overarching concept of OCS.  We quickly discovered that 
improving certain aspects of OCS also strengthened CUE in contingency situations.  
Additionally, our respondents indicated the need to improve existing JP 4-10 
doctrine as a start point.  Improved doctrine provides the necessary foundation on 
which to plan and train effective OCS activities.  We have identified the following four 
recommendations to increase CUE in the CENTCOM AOR and other combatant 
commands in similar contingency situations.   
1. Recommendation #1: Create organizations that help OCS 
synchronization at the COCOM and service levels. 
Effective OCS synchronization requires more than an OCS planning cell 
within the COCOM J-4 planning staff.  The need for joint OCS integration cells 
across all COCOMs and service components at the earliest planning phases is 
critical to mission success and subsequent CUE. Within the DOTMLPF–P 
framework, the following recommendations can be addressed using organization-
level solutions.   
OCS mission integrator: Although JCASO provides two OCS planners to 
the COCOM staffs, we recommend a more robust integration cell to bring about 
greater CUE.  Mentioned several times throughout our interviews, the OMI provides 
an example of this integrated team.  The OMI consists of four to six OCS integration 
planners, which can include a contracting professional, logistician, financial 
manager, engineer, and lawyer. The purpose of this integration team is to assist in 
OCS planning efforts and could be tailored to meet the specific needs of a 
geographical combatant command.  Additionally, the OMI could serve as the 
nucleus for establishing a contracting organization in a given combatant 
commander’s area, should a contingency take place.    
Contracting Support Teams: CSTs are currently being discussed within the 
Army as a way of integrating OCS planning and execution at the corp- and division-
level headquarters. The current practice of integrating OCS within the Army is done 
ad hoc and does not facilitate synchronization or CUE. We recommend all services 
incorporate CSTs with the purpose of assisting OCS planning and training efforts.  
Services can tailor their CSTs to fit their specific missions.   
Center of Excellence: Until recently, the acquisition community lacked a 
center of excellence to help synchronize the rapidly developing capability of OCS.  In 
2011, the Army established the Army Acquisition Center of Excellence to provide 
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OCS leadership, education, and best practices to aid OCS planning and execution 
activities.  We recommend sustaining this organization to assist with institutionalizing 
OCS and codifying OCS lessons learned.  Finally, this center can be utilized to 
establish acquisition educational courses to non-acquisition personnel involved with 
OCS planning activities. 
2. Recommendation #2: Establish clear contracting command and 
control for any given operation.   
In order to achieve better CUE, we recommend senior DoD leaders establish 
clear contracting command and control for various mission types at the earliest 
planning phase.  This C2 structure should be reinforced with operational orders and 
backed by doctrine.  Using the DOTMLPF–P framework, this can be accomplished 
by taking doctrine and policy approaches.  According to the unpublished version of 
JP 4-10 (CJCS, 2012a) and many of our respondents, OCS planners can choose 
from three different contracting constructs: lead service for contracting coordination, 
lead service for all theater support contracting, and joint theater support contracting 
command (CJCS, 2012a). The specific C2 organization chosen should be based on 
size, scope, expected duration, and various other mission factors.  Many of our 
respondents mentioned there is not a “one-size-fits-all” contracting construct.  
Additionally, as the operation progresses to different phases, the situation may 
dictate the need to change contracting constructs to provide the contracting 
commander with more authority.  
3. Recommendation # 3: Institutionalize OCS to create more efficient 
OCS planning, training, and execution.  
Although the DoD has made significant progress in institutionalizing OCS, 
additional improvement and changes are required.  Our research and interviews 
highlight the importance of bringing about cultural change in OCS.  Taking a holistic 
approach, the acquisition community will have to address several categories of the 
DOTMLPF–P framework to improve OCS. 
Leadership and Education: Beginning in 2005, significant strides have been 
made in integrating OCS policy, regulation, and doctrine.  However, many within the 
DoD still view OCS as a contracting and logistical function.  To change this view, the 
culture of the military needs to view OCS in a different light.  We recommend senior 
DoD leaders continue to provide active support for OCS education and awareness.  
Recent legislation from Congress has mandated joint OCS education, which many of 
our respondents identified as key to reinforcing change and improving OCS.  Finally, 
to bring about greater institutionalization, we recommend OCS education be 
provided at the  basic and advanced courses for officers and non-commissioned 
officers.  These OCS courses should be offered to non-acquisition and acquisition 
personnel. 
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Training and Exercises: Institutionalizing OCS can also be improved with 
training and exercises.  The joint OCS planning and execution course is an effort 
currently being developed by the J-4 to teach military members on how to be OCS 
planners.  This course, while focused on combatant command and service staffs, 
can also apply to operational contracting organizations.  This course will focus on 
contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management.  We 
recommend OCS training be provided to planners in all functional areas to stress the 
importance of OCS and bring about greater CUE.   
Many interviewees stressed the importance of including OCS into exercises 
to enhance CUE and improve OCS.  Given the extent to which contractors support 
the warfighter, we recommend incorporating OCS into exercises to stay within the 
“train as you fight” guideline.  The OCS joint exercise, scheduled for January 2014, 
provides a great opportunity to train OCS at the joint level.  This exercise will provide 
contracting support and contract support integration training to deployable 
contracting officers, and OCS planners from U.S. Northern Command.  Although this 
exercise is at the joint level, training events like this can be done at the service levels 
to raise the stature of OCS and enhance CUE during contingencies. 
4. Recommendation # 4: Improve existing OCS tools and processes. 
Due to the many potential contracting agencies operating in a given COCOM 
area during a contingency, the DoD’s ability to achieve CUE depends on having the 
appropriate tools to manage contracts and contractor personnel.  Tools such as 
TBC, SPOT, LOA, JARB, and the JCSB can provide the DoD with effective ways to 
increase CUE, mitigate risks, manage contracts, track contractor personnel, and 
assist in identifying vendors working against U.S. interests.  Based on our research, 
we recommend improving these tools to increase CUE and improve OCS in future 
contingencies.  Within the DOTMLPF–P framework, this recommendation can be 
addressed by taking doctrine and policy approaches.   
 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH D.
Throughout the course of our study, we discovered various areas for further 
OCS research.  Some of the areas requiring further research include the following: 
1. Examine the impact of external and system support contracts on 
contracting unity of effort in a given geographical combatant command.   
2. Examine the advantages and disadvantages of giving HCA authority to 
a geographical combatant commander.  
3. Conduct a cost–benefit analysis for establishing an acquisition center 
of excellence for the Army or joint wide.   
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4. Determine the efficiency and effectiveness of capturing OCS lessons 
learned and subsequent integration into doctrine and policy.   
5. Examine the feasibility of establishing an acquisition branch within the 
Army.     
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